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This Article engages recent scholarly debates about U.S. Supreme Court
tenure and retirement practices, specifically those concerning the merits of
adopting eighteen-year term limits or mandatory retirement for Supreme Court
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Justices. It broadens the discussion by including all Article III judges and by
addressing former Article III judges' return to practice following resignation or
retirement, which has been largely ignored in the literature to date despite what
I have found to be the return-to-practice rate of over forty percent in the last
two decades.I
To place the U.S. debate in context and better understand the range of
possible approaches to judicial retirement and return-to-practice questions, this
Article compares Article III rules and practices with those for the higher
judiciary in England and Wales,2 revealing their polar-opposite approaches to
these issues, as Diagram 1 reflects.
DIAGRAM 1
LIFE TENURE LIFE TENURE WITH
MANDATORY
RETIREMENT
No PROHIBITION ON U.S. Article III
FORMER JUDGES' RETURN judiciary
TO PRACTICE
PROHIBITION OR English and Welsh
CONVENTION AGAINST higherjudiciary
JUDGES' RETURN TO
PRACTICE
1. See infra app. B at 70.
2. The higher judiciary in England and Wales includes the High Court, the Court of
Appeal, and the new U.K. Supreme Court, which replaced the Appellate Committee of the House
of Lords in 2009. Appellate Committee ofthe House ofLords, SUP. CT., http://www.supreme
court.gov.uk/about/appellate-committee.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2011); Going to Court,
JUDICIARY ENG. & WALES, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-and-the-judiciary/going-to-
court/going-to-court.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2011). As of 2010, there were 161 higher court
judgeships in England and Wales. Judicial Expenses, JUDICIARY ENG. & WALES,
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/judges-magistrates-and-tribunal-judges/
terms-of-service/judicial-expenses.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
This Article focuses on the judiciary of England and Wales, not the judiciaries of Northern
Ireland or Scotland, because each jurisdiction in the United Kingdom has its own judicial-conduct
code and legal, professional culture, and this Article focuses on the largest and most prominent
jurisdiction, England and Wales. See The Justice System and the Constitution, JUDICIARY ENG.
& WALES, http://wwwjudiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-in-detail/jud-acc-
ind/justice-sys-and-constitution (last visited Sept. I1, 2011).
842 [Vol. 60:1
Judicial Retirement and Return to Practice
Diagram 2 fills in the remaining cells, first with Alternative One, which
reflects recent proposals to introduce fixed-service terms or mandatory
retirement for U.S. Supreme Court Justices. These proposals do not address
former Article III judges' return to practice and do not suggest altering current
rules, which do not prohibit return, as Diagram 2 reflects. Alternative Two,
recommended by this Article, retains life tenure without fixed terms of service
or mandatory retirement for all Article III judges and introduces a prohibition
on former Article III judges' return to practice.
DIAGRAM 2
LIFE TENURE
No PROHIBITION ON
FORMER JUDGES'
RETURN TO PRACTICE U.S. Article III judiciary
LIFE TENURE WITH
MANDATORY
RETIREMENT
Alternative One
[reflected in recent
proposals for fixed-
service terms or
mandatory retirement
for U.S. Supreme Court
Justices]
PROHIBITION OR Alternative Two English and Welsh
CONVENTION AGAINST [reflected in this higher judiciary
JUDGES' RETURN TO Article's reform
PRACTICE recommendations]
This Article advocates retaining life tenure because it promotes institutional
and individual judicial independence better than either fixed terms of service or
mandatory retirement. Life tenure promotes institutional independence by
safeguarding the judiciary's ability to exercise autonomy and power with
respect to the other branches, and it promotes individual independence by
furthering individual judges' abilities to decide cases free of fear or favor. 3 In
both respects, life tenure promotes judicial independence better than either
fixed terms or mandatory retirement.4  Life tenure should also be retained
because the proposed alternatives do not satisfactorily redress the asserted
3. See infra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part 1.
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concerns about life tenure, but instead risk potentially significant negative
consequences to judicial impartiality and integrity as well as independence.5
This Article also recommends prohibiting former Article III judges from
returning to law practice and legal consulting because both raise concerns for
negative effects on judicial independence, impartiality, and integrity.6  This
recommendation is also informed by concern that actual or apparent
self-dealing by judges considering post-bench employment threatens the
public's trust and confidence in the courts.7
The Article begins by highlighting the recent scholarly debates over fixed
terms of service and mandatory retirement for U.S. Supreme Court Justices.
Part I also notes the dearth of scholarship on former Article III judges' return
to practice and encourages further debate on this point. In Part II, the Article
compares and contrasts judicial retirement and return-to-practice rules and
conventions for the Article III and English and Welsh higher judiciaries.
The Article concludes by recommending against fixed terms and mandatory
retirement for Article III judges, instead advocating reforms to encourage
more, earlier voluntary retirement and the introduction of formal
self-monitoring of misconduct and disability by Supreme Court Justices, as is
currently done by lower federal courts pursuant to the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980.8 Lastly, this Article recommends prohibiting former
Article III judges from returning to law practice and legal consulting, given the
potential for actual and apparent conflicts of interest.
I. RECENT SCHOLARLY DEBATE OVER INTRODUCING FIXED TERMS OF
SERVICE OR MANDATORY RETIREMENT FOR U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
A. Fixed Terms
Much has been written lately about the need to abolish life tenure for
Supreme Court Justices. A number of scholars have advocated non-renewable
fixed terms of service to replace life tenure.9 This Article focuses on two of
5. See Ward Farnsworth, Resolved, The Terms of the Supreme Court Justices Should Be
Limited to Eighteen Years: Con, in DEBATING REFORM: CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON How
To FIX THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 245, 250 (Richard J. Ellis & Michael Nelson eds.,
2011) ("There is much to be said for leaving the Constitution alone unless it is clear that revising
it would create net benefits. . . . Those who wish to end life tenure for Supreme Court justices
have a high standard of proof to satisfy, and Calabresi and Lindgren have come up short."); infra
notes 97, 119-21 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 321 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 396-409 and accompanying text
8. Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2006)).
9. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court:
Life Tenure Reconsidered, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES 15 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) [hereinafter Calabresi &
Lindgren, original version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court]; Steven G. Calabresi & James
844 [Vol. 60:1
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the fixed-term proposals that have garnered the most attention, those of (1)
Professors Steven Calabresi and James Lindgrenlo and (2) Professors Paul
Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 769 (2006) [hereinafter Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the
Supreme Court] (providing an extended version of the original article to include additional
relevant data and to offer responses to earlier scholarly criticism and comments); Paul D.
Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A Return to Basic Principles,
in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra, at 467
[hereinafter Carrington & Cramton, print version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act]; Paul D.
Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A Return to Basic Principles,
PAUL DEWITT CARRINGTON (July 5, 2005), www.paulcarrington.com/Supreme%20Court% 2 0
Renewal%20Act.htm [hereinafter Carrington & Cramton, online version of The Supreme Court
Renewal Act]; Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton et al., Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act
of 2009, Proposal I: Regular Appointments to the Supreme Court, PAUL DEWITT CARRINGTON
(Feb. 9, 2009), http://paulcarrington.com/Four%20Proposals%2For/ 2OA%20Judiciary% 2 0Act
.htm (proposing biennial appointment of Supreme Court Justices and rotation of duties after
eighteen years of service).
Prior to these proposals, Professors Philip Oliver and Lucas Powe, Jr. had also advocated
non-renewable, eighteen-year fixed terms of service on the Supreme Court; Oliver principally
advocated regularity of turnover on the Court, allowing every presidential administration two
nominations and avoiding strategic retirement. Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed
Constitutional Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United States
Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 800, 811-12 (1986); see L. A. Powe, Jr., Go Geezers Go:
Leaving the Bench, 25 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 1227, 1235 (2000); L. A. Powe, Jr., Old People and
Good Behavior, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 195, 196-97 (1995) ("Life tenure is the Framers' greatest
lasting mistake."); see also L. A. Powe, Jr., Marble Palace, We've Got a Problem-With You, in
REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra, at 99, 107.
Professor Sanford Levinson also has written in support of tenure limitations on the Supreme
Court. See Sanford Levinson, Contempt of Court: The Most Important 'Contemporary
Challenge' to Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 341-42 (1992); Sanford Levinson, Life
Tenure and the Supreme Court: What Is To Be Done?, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS
FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra, at 375, 376.
One scholar, Professor Judith Resnik, has suggested that Article III could be reinterpreted to
permit fixed terms rather than life tenure, obviating the need for a constitutional amendment or
statute. Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life
Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 584 (2005) (applying the fixed-term concept to the lower
Article III judiciary as well as the Supreme Court and suggesting that Article III could be
reinterpreted to permit fixed terms, thus obviating the need for a constitutional amendment or
statute); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Packages ofJudicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure
of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 997, 1000-06 (2007) (highlighting and synthesizing this
debate).
Finally, Professor Michael Mazza has examined the desirability of fixed terms of service at
the court of appeals level and charted the history of term-limit proposals in the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Michael J. Mazza, A New Look at an Old Debate: Life Tenure and the
Article III Judge, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 131, 133, 143-47, 155-62 (2003); see infra text
accompanying notes 149-52.
10. See Calabresi & Lindgren, original version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra
note 9; Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9.
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Carrington and Roger Cramton. Calabresi and Lindgren propose a
constitutional amendment imposing non-renewable, eighteen-year terms for
Supreme Court Justices,12 and Carrington and Cramton propose adopting a
similar scheme by means of the "Supreme Court Renewal Act."' 3  Both
Calabresi and Lindgren's and Carrington and Cramton's proposals anticipate
that Justices will retire to senior status at the expiration of their eighteen-year
terms and then serve on the lower federal courts or in place of recused
Justices.14  Notably, Calabresi and Lindgren consider Carrington and
Cramton's proposed statute to be unconstitutional, 5 a position with which
many commentators agree.16 Neither proposal addresses the tenure of Article
III judges below the Supreme Court level. Calabresi and Lindgren instead
acknowledge that "any attempt to institute term limits for lower federal court
judges would present enormous administrative problems that might outweigh
any benefits of limiting tenures for those judges." 7
Calabresi and Lindgren's and Carrington and Cramton's proposals to limit
Supreme Court service to non-renewable, eighteen-year terms were motivated
in substantial part by concerns for potential negative effects associated with
11. See Carrington & Cramton, print version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act, supra note
9; Carrington & Cramton, online version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act, supra note 9.
12. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 770-72 (emphasizing a pronounced growth in the length of Supreme Court tenure in the
second half of the twentieth century and proposing eighteen-year term limits for Supreme Court
Justices). But see David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, An Empirical Analysis of Life Tenure: A
Response to Professors Calabresi and Lindgren, 30 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 791 passim (2007)
(critiquing the data and analysis relied on by Calabresi and Lindgren).
In opposing life tenure for Supreme Court Justices, Calabresi and Lindgren draw on
commentators such as Robert Yates, who-writing as "Brutus"-opposed life tenure on
democratic-accountability grounds. See Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for
the Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 773 (citing ROBERT YATES, BRUTUS No. XV (Mar. 20,
1788), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS 350, 350-52 (Cecilia M. Kenyon ed., 1966)).
Calabresi and Lindgren also cite Thomas Jefferson, who advocated short, renewable terms and,
more contemporarily, Oliver and Powe. See id. at 773-74.
Calabresi and Lindgren claim that "only one figure, Professor Ward Farnsworth of Boston
University, has defended life tenure as it currently operates." Id. at 774 (citing Ward Farnsworth,
The Regulation of Turnover on the Supreme Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 408).
13. Carrington & Cramton, print version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act, supra note 9,
at 467-71 (proposing adoption of Supreme Court term limits by statutory change).
14. See Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra
note 9, at 856-58; Carrington & Cramton, online version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act,
supra note 9.
15. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 776; accord David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a
"Golden Parachute", 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397, 1418-19 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, The Case for Life Tenure, in REFORMING THE
COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 9, at 251, 265-66; Stras &
Scott, supra note 12, at 793.
17. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 772 n.10.
Judicial Retirement and Return to Practice
lengthened Supreme Court tenure, which they charted as growing from an
average of 14.9 years for Justices retiring between 1789 and 1970, to 26.1
years for Justices retiring between 1971 and 2005.18 According to all four
authors, three main problems arise from lengthened tenure: (1) a pronounced
lack of democratic accountability on the part of the Court and its members; (2)
a highly politicized Supreme Court confirmation process, given its
unpredictable and infrequent occurrence; and (3) an increased potential for
mental "decrepitude" among long-serving Justices.19 Closely related to the
first concern, Carrington and Cramton assert that life tenure has led to
20
excessive arrogance, hubris, and abuse of office by Supreme Court Justices.
Calabresi and Lindgren and Carrington and Cramton argue that replacing life
tenure with non-renewable, fixed terms for Supreme Court Justices would
redress all of these concerns.2 1
1. Concern for Democratic-Accountability Effects of Lengthened Supreme
Court Tenure
With regard to their first point, all four scholars assert that regular,
predictable resignations from and appointments to the Court would promote
the democratic accountability of the Court and its members more effectively
than life tenure, particularly given the recent lengthening of Justices' tenures.
According to these authors, judicial confirmation hearings constitute the only
real moment of accountability for the Court because no Justice has ever been
removed from office by means of impeachment, the other principal mechanism
of democratic accountability. 23 Thus, the increasing length of Supreme Court
service results in fewer hearings and less accountability.
As Professors David Stras and Ryan Scott make clear, however, Calabresi
and Lindgren's choice of time periods of study of Supreme Court tenure
exaggerates the lengthened service effect upon which their democratic
18. Id. at 770-71, 778- 79.
19. Id. at 809-18.
20. Carrington & Cramton, print version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act, supra note 9,
at 468 (discussing the founders' fears of unchecked power). But see Farnsworth, supra note 16,
at 261 ("[M]ost of the hubris in Supreme Court opinions probably is attributable mostly to
sources other than life tenure.").
21. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 772; Carrington & Cramton, online version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act, supra note
9.
22. See Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra
note 9, at 810-11; Carrington & Cramton, print version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act,
supra note 9, at 468.
23. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 810-12; Carrington & Cramton, print version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act, supra
note 9, at 468; see also Daniel J. Meador, Thinking About Age and Supreme Court Tenure, in
REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 9, at 115,
115.
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24
accountability argument is premised. Calabresi and Lindgren's
contemporary period of study-with Justices retiring between 1971 and
2005-is an outlier in the history of Supreme Court tenure because four
Justices who retired during this period served longer than almost any other
Justice: Hugo Black (34.1 years), William Brennan (33.8 years), William 0.
Douglas (36.6 years), and William Rehnquist (33.7 years). Although Calabresi
and Lindgren recognize that these Justices are some of the longest-serving in
U.S. history, they fail to acknowledge that their choice of 1971 as the
beginning of their contemporary period resulted in their capturing two of the
longest-serving Justices, Black and Douglas, who retired in 1971 and 1975,
respectively.25 Had Calabresi and Lindgren not included these Justices in their
modem period, their lengthened-tenure effect would have been decidedly less
dramatic,26 instead reflecting Stras and Scott's finding that Supreme Court
tenure has grown slowly and steadily over time.27  Indeed, Professor Kevin
McGuire has found that "the tenure of the justices has been quite stable over
time."28
In responding to Calabresi and Lindgren's and Carrington and Cramton's
first concern for lengthened tenure's weakening of democratic accountability,
Professor Stephen Burbank underscores the cramped understanding of
accountability in which these authors' life tenure critiques are grounded.2 As
Burbank states, their proposals mistakenly conceive of accountability as
"dichotomous" from judicial independence, rather than viewing the two as
being in an inherently dynamic relationship. 30
24. Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 794-95, 799-807; Stras & Scott, supra note 15, at 1427,
1428 chart 1.
25. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 779.
26. See Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 799-807. Moving the start date in Calabresi and
Lindgren's study from 1970 to either 1975 or 1965 would reduce the average tenure length for
that period from 26.1 years to 25.1 or 22.1 years, respectively. Id. at 804 n.58.
U.C.-Irvine political scientists Bernard Grofnan and Reuben Kline have also challenged
Calabresi and Lindgren's and Carrington and Cramton's findings of lengthened tenure based on
their choice of study periods, concluding that the current average length of service is not that
different from early nineteenth-century service terms "even if there is some evidence of a slight
increase in length of service in very recent decades." Bernard Grofman & Reuben Kline, A New
Measure for Understanding the Tenure of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 93 JUDICATURE 247,
249-50 (2010).
27. Stras & Scott, supra note 15, at 1427-30.
28. Kevin T. McGuire, An Assessment of Tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, 89
JUDICATURE 8, 10, 12 (2005), quoted in Stephen B. Burbank, An Interdisciplinary Perspective on
the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES, supra note 9, at 317, 321.
29. See Burbank, supra note 28, at 319, 326-27.
30. Id. at 319; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the
Tenure of Supreme Court Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1511, 1523-24 (2006) [hereinafter
Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II); Stephen B. Burbank et al., Reconsidering Judicial
Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
848 [Vol. 60:1
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Moreover, Calabresi and Lindgren's and Carrington and Cramton's
proposals may undermine, rather than promote, accountability, as reliance on
non-renewable terms creates incentives for Justices to use their positions to
maximize, or at the very least preserve, their prospects for post-bench
employment by actually or apparently issuing judgments favorable to potential
employers.31 Professor Ward Farnsworth, like Stras and Scott, highlighted this
danger of actual or potential self-dealing by term-limited judges:
[A]ny regime other than life tenure will push some Justices out of
office while they are still lucid and thus create a risk that they will
use their time at the Court to angle for attractive situations
afterwards. It need not be a question of bad faith; the greater hazard
is a subtle bias reminding its holder that letting down one's friends
now can have disappointing professional consequences later.32
According to Farnsworth, judicial self-dealing to preserve future employment
prospects is of greatest concern in the case of fixed-term service-though also
present in mandatory-retirement schemes-because "the result often may be to
produce ex-Justices still in the prime of their careers."33
Calabresi and Lindgren's partial response to this self-dealing concern is that
under a term-limit scheme, presidents will not have an incentive to appoint
young Justices, as they do under life tenure;3 4 thus concern for judicial
self-dealing may be allayed because older Justices would presumably be less
interested in returning to practice following the completion of their Supreme
Court service. Beyond that, under Calabresi and Lindgren's and Carrington
and Cramton's term-limit proposals, "expired" Justices may continue to hear
cases in lower federal courts or may substitute for recused justices,35 which
would presumably limit interest in return to non-judicial employment.
Calabresi and Lindgren do not offer empirical support, however, for the
propositions that judicial appointees will be older under a term-limit scheme or
APPROACH 9, 9-11 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) [hereinafter Burbank et
al., Reconsidering Judicial Independence] (identifying the "erroneous premise" that underlies
discussions of judicial independence, which considers "judicial independence and judicial
accountability [as] discrete concepts at war with each other, when in fact they are complementary
concepts that can and should be regarded as allies").
31. Stras & Scott, supra note 15, at 1424-25 ("Life tenure promotes independence in
several ways. . . . [I]t means that federal judges 'have reached the end of their official careers,'
rendering them unconcerned about angling for future political appointment . . . . Even fixed,
nonrenewable terms . . . would introduce incentives for Supreme Court Justices to cast votes in a
way that improves their prospects for future employment outside the judiciary." (footnotes
omitted)).
32. Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 446.
33. Id; Farnsworth, supra note 16, at 264 ("A justice at the end of an eighteen-year term
may still be in his sixties and thus have significant professional prospects . . . .").
34. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 837-38.
35. Id at 856-58; Carrington & Cramton, online version of The Supreme Court Renewal
Act, supra note 9.
2011] 849
Catholic University Law Review
that former Justices would opt to serve as lower federal court judges rather
than return to practice. 36 Indeed, Calabresi and Lindgren acknowledge that
their "proposal may have no impact on the current trend of appointing
individuals in their fifties."37
Farnsworth, for one, is skeptical that former Supreme Court Justices would
choose service as district or appellate court judges over "more intriguing
opportunities elsewhere," including the "remunerative lure of' private practice
or the prestige of high-level government appointment, "the prospects for which
would depend on the justice's ability to stay well-liked by the party in
power,"38 thereby highlighting the self-dealing concern.
Farnsworth's primary critique of Calabresi and Lindgren's and Carrington
and Cramton's democratic-accountability rationale is that long Supreme Court
tenures-facilitated by life tenure-slow the development of the law, whereas
shorter tenures--comparable to fixed-service proposals-lead to faster changes
in decisional law, rendering it more responsive to public opinion, 39 which is
more akin to Congress's function than to the function historically associated
with the Court. 40 According to Farnsworth, "when advocates of term limits
claim the Court has become too distant from the public, they are taking a
position on how much to trust conclusions majorities reach over shorter and
longer periods of time," favoring the shorter.41
Despite his advocacy for mandatory retirement, Professor David Garrow
rejects Calabresi and Lindgren's and Carrington and Cramton's term-limit
proposals as ideologically and politically motivated attempts to constrain the
Court's power and bring it into closer conformity with public opinion.42
According to Garrow, it is "all too undeniably clear that the present initiative
for Supreme Court term-limits is in its essence an ideologically-motivated
'Trojan Horse' masquerading as a non-partisan modernization reform."43
Garrow emphasizes Calabresi and Lindgren's assertion that "'enhancing
popular control over the Court's constitutional interpretations will actually lead
to better decisions than are produced by the current system."' 44 Calabresi and
Lindgren expand on this point by asserting that "the general public is more
likely than are nine life-tenured lawyers to interpret the Constitution in a way
36. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 837.
37. Id.
38. Farnsworth, supra note 16, at 263.
39. Id. at 251-53.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 253.
42. David J. Garrow, Protecting and Enhancing the U.S. Supreme Court, in REFORMING
THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 9, at 271, 278-80.
43. Id. at 280.
44. Id. at 280 & n.58 (quoting Calabresi & Lindgren, original version of Term Limits for the
Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 59).
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that is faithful to its text and history, which is how constitutional decision
making ought to proceed."4 5 This understanding of the optimal approach to
constitutional interpretation is at the heart of Calabresi and Lindgren's and
Carrington and Cramton's democratic-accountability critique of life tenure.46
2. Politicization ofJudicial Confirmation Process
Calabresi and Lindgren's and Carrington and Cramton's second rationale for
adopting non-renewable, eighteen-year terms is that Supreme Court
confirmation hearings would become less politicized than at present because
they would occur regularly and predictablZ every two years, with two
appointments per presidential administration. There is no reason to think,
however, that Supreme Court confirmation hearings will become any less
contentious simply because they occur more often; rather, the opposite may
well be true.48 As Burbank and Farnsworth suggest, confirmation hearings
could become more embittered if more frequent because they could become
the target of reular campaigning by liberal and conservative interest groups,
among others. Garrow suggests that Supreme Court appointments could
come to be regarded as the "political spoils" of presidential elections under
term-limit proposals, thereby exacerbating, rather than lessening, the
50politicization of both the Court and the confirmation process.
Furthermore, Calabresi and Lindgren and Carrington and Cramton argue that
life tenure politicizes the appointment process because it leads to strategic
retirement-that is, to a Justice timing his or her retirement to increase the
likelihood that a president of his or her favored political party will have the
45. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 833.
46. See, e.g., id. at 809-13; Carrington & Cramton, online version of The Supreme Court
Renewal Act, supra note 9.
47. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 813, 832-33; see Carrington & Cramton, print version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act,
supra note 9, at 469, 471.
48. See, e.g., Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II, supra note 30, at 1545-47;
Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 433 ("Meanwhile there is reason to worry that fixed terms would
make the unappealing features of the confirmation process worse. By attaching nominating
chances to presidencies they would create more natural cycles of revenge . . . ."); see also Arthur
D. Hellman, Reining in the Supreme Court: Are Term Limits the Answer?, in REFORMING THE
COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 9, at 291, 298 (utilizing fixed
terms for Justices "would significantly increase the politicization" of the selection process beyond
current levels).
49. See Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II, supra note 30, at 1537-47; Farnsworth,
supra note 12, at 434.
50. Garrow, supra note 42, at 281; see also Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 434 ("If Justices
served terms of eighteen years, one no longer would speak of the possibility that the winner of a
presidential election might make appointments to the Court. Every winner would be guaranteed
two of them. The stakes for the Court in every campaign thus would be higher than they
currently are.").
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opportunity to name a like-minded replacement.5' By contrast, recent studies
have found "no consistent support for justices taking partisan factors into
account, either in their retirement decisions or in their decisions to remain on
the bench."52 Indeed, one advocate of mandatory retirement concluded that the
"single most important" influence on justices' decisions to leave the bench is
the availability of "a formal retirement provision with generous benefits." 53
Although Calabresi and Lindgren and Carrington and Cramton limit their
proposals to Supreme Court tenure, other commentators have questioned the
strategic-retirement hypothesis as it applies to lower court judges, again
identifying pension eligibility as the leading determinant of retirement
decisions.
3. Mental Decrepitude
Calabresi and Lindgren's and Carrington and Cramton's third argument for
term limits rests on concern for mental decrepitude occurring among Supreme
51. Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court: An
Introduction, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra
note 9, at 3, 7 (asserting that all participants in the symposium on which the book was based
agreed that "current [tenure] arrangements create incentives for strategic behavior by presidents,
justices and senators that may not be in the interest of the Court or the public"); Calabresi &
Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 801-02
("Although this analysis does not prove that justices have engaged in strategic gaming-and
indeed, more sophisticated time-series analyses would be advisable-the data are consistent with
that conclusion, which is bolstered by the anecdotal evidence.").
. 52. Christopher J. W. Zom & Steven R. Van Winkle, A Competing Risks Model of Supreme
Court Vacancies, 1789-1992, 22 POL. BEHAV. 145, 160 (2000), quoted in Burbank, supra note
28, at 323; accord Garrow, supra note 42, at 277 (referring to the work of Professor Saul Brenner
as "persuasively demonstrat[ing that] sitting justices since 1937 have time and again delayed and
postponed their retirements rather than step down at ideologically advantageous earlier
opportunities" (citing Saul Brenner, The Myth that Justices Strategically Retire, 36 SOC. SCI. J.
431 (1999))).
53. ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING To LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 225 (2003).
54. Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal
Judges, 1869-2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143, 177 (2006); see also Judith Resnik, Democratic
Responses to the Breadth of Power of the Chief Justice, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 9, at 181, 182 & n. I (citing Yoon's finding of
pension eligibility as leading predictor of judicial retirement); Stras & Scott, supra note 15, at
1432-36 (citing political scientists' skeptical empirical analyses of the strategic-retirement
thesis). But see Stephen J. Choi et al., The Law and Policy ofJudicial Retirement 22 (N.Y. Univ.
Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-24; N.Y.
Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-12; Univ. of Chi.
Law Sch., Law & Econ., Olin Research Paper No. 549, 2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1792422 (finding that "[w]ealthy [district court] judges are less sensitive
to . .. [pension] incentives").
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Court Justices.55 Calabresi and Lindgren argue that eighteen-year terms might
likely expire before any Justice suffered "mental decrepitude,"5 6 which they
define by briefly referencing Garrow's article concerning mental decrepitude
on the Supreme Court. Calabresi and Lindgren observe that "the advanced
age of some Supreme Court Justices has at times led to a problem of 'mental
decrepitude' on the Court, whereby some Justices have been physically or
mentally unable to fulfill their duties during the final stages of their career."58
Carrington and Cramton frame the mental decrepitude question with greater
nuance than do Calabresi and Lindgren.59  Acknowledging that the 1980
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act works "reasonably well" to redress
competence questions at the lower federal court level,60 Carrington and
Cramton observe that Supreme Court Justices are left largely to their own
devices in regulating their work, with few choosing to take senior status or
retire altogether when confronted with a disability, despite their eligibility to
do so.61 According to Carrington and Cramton, Supreme Court Justices can
and do take steps short of leaving the bench to make their workload more
manageable when faced with physical or mental disability or diminished
energy level; such steps include constricting the Court's docket and delegating
62increased responsibility to law clerks. However, these mechanisms constitute
inappropriate exercises of Supreme Court power, according to Carrington and
Cramton.63 They argue that the potential for Justices' diminished abilities
should instead be redressed by reliance on fixed terms of service.64
55. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 815-18; Carrington & Cramton, online version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act, supra
note 9.
56. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 839-40.
57. Id at 771-72 (citing David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court:
The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995 (2000)). Garrow does not
provide a definition of "mental decrepitude" at the start of his study, but provides a number of
definitions in the context of his account of Justices suffering from mental decrepitude, including:
mentally incompetent, mentally unstable, suffering from mental incapacity, dependent on
sleeping pills, suffering from the after-effects of strokes (major and minor), being mentally
disabled, experiencing mental deterioration, having declining mental acuity, experiencing
declining mental energy, suffering nervous breakdowns, experiencing mental confusion, and
suffering from memory loss. Garrow, supra, passim.
58. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 771-72 (citing Garrow, supra note 57, at 995).
59. Carrington & Cramton, print version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act, supra note 9,
at 469-70.
60. Id. at 469.
61. Id at 470.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 471.
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Calabresi and Lindgren's and Carrington and Cramton's proposals fail to
redress the mental decrepitude concern satisfactorily, however, because
debilitating disabilities can occur unpredictably, depending on an individual's
life experiences (such as disease, accidents, or trauma) and age at the time of
appointment.6 5  Indeed, Calabresi and Lindgren acknowledge that their
proposal is "not directly responsive to the problem of mental decrepitude on
the Court," but assert that it "would significantly further the goal of preventing
mentally or physically decrepit Justices from serving on the Court."66 For
support, Calabresi and Lindgren rely on Garrow's evidence that nine of the
eighteen instances of mental decrepitude on the Court have arisen after
eighteen years of service, and thus their Xroposal would have prevented fifty
percent of those cases from occurring, although Calabresi and Lindgren
attribute to Garrow a different list of Supreme Court Justices suffering from
mental decrepitude than Garrow himself presents.68 Calabresi and Lindgren
acknowledge that their proposal would have done nothing to prevent the
65. Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 447 ("[A] Justice appointed later in life to an
eighteen-year term may well serve past age seventy-five, making limited terms . . . less reliable
than age limits as measures to reduce the risk of decrepitude.").
66. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 838.
67. Id. at 838-39 & nn.233-34 (citing Garrow, supra note 57, at 1084-85).
68. Calabresi and Lindgren ascribe the following list of Justices suffering mental
decrepitude to Garrow: (1) John Rutledge; (2) William Cushing; (3) Henry Baldwin; (4) Robert
Grier; (5) Nathan Clifford; (6) Stephen Field; (7) Joseph McKenna; (8) William Howard Taft; (9)
Oliver Wendell Holmes; (10) Frank Murphy; (11) Sherman Minton; (12) Charles Whittaker; (13)
Hugo Black; (14) William 0. Douglas; (15) William Rehnquist; (16) Lewis Powell; (17) William
Brennan; and (18) Thurgood Marshall. Id. at 838 n.232 (citing Garrow, supra note 57).
Calabresi and Lindgren rely on this list for their assertion that nine of these eighteen Justices
would have been "term-limited" under their proposal before the Justices' mental decrepitude
arose. Id at 838-39. Garrow himself offers a different list of mentally decrepit Supreme Court
Justices:
While the pre-twentieth-century Court featured at least four justices-Baldwin,
Grier, Clifford, and Fried-and perhaps two more-Rutledge and Cushing-whose
mental incapacity should have barred their continued service, the twentieth-century
Court has featured eleven justices whose mental decrepitude or mentally infirm
judgment should have led to their departure from the bench years or months before they
did vacate their seats. . . . Chief Justices Fuller and Taft, and Justices McKenna and
Holmes, all remained on the Court longer than their colleagues and relatives knew was
in the public interest. . . . Murphy and Whittaker-suffered from conditions which
should have precluded their ongoing service, and five others-Minton, Black, Douglas,
Powell, and Marshall-all overstayed the length of service their mental energies were
capable of rendering.
Garrow, supra note 57, at 1084-85. Thus, Garrow included Chief Justice Melvin Fuller, who
Calabresi and Lindgren omitted, and did not include Rehnquist and Brennan, who Calabresi and
Lindgren attributed to him.
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remaining fifty percent of mental decrepitude cases from occurring because
69
they arose before eighteen years of service had elapsed.
In addition to failing to address disabilities that could arise prior to a
Justice's term expiring, Calabresi and Lindgren's proposed reform would force
competent Justices to leave the bench long before they would otherwise choose
to retire simply because their terms had expired, thereby depriving the legal
system and the public of that Justice's knowledge and expertise.70 Moreover,
their proposal for "expired" Justices to serve on the lower federal courts (or as
substitutes for recused Justices) ignores their concern for Justices developing
mental decrepitude, as any such service would occur after the eighteen-year
mark.n As Farnsworth questions, is mental decrepitude any less important on
the lower courts than on the Supreme Court? 72 A more effective reform is for
the Supreme Court to introduce a mechanism for monitoring and redressing
relevant disabilities,73 similar to the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act for the
lower federal courts.74
B. Mandatory Retirement
Apart from term limits, a handful of commentators have advocated
mandatory retirement at age seventy-five instead of life tenure for Supreme
Court Justices. 75 None of these commentators have addressed the merits of
mandatory retirement below the Supreme Court level. In recommending an
age limit of seventy-five for Supreme Court service, Garrow provides the most
in-depth study of mental decrepitude occurring on the Court to date, charting a
comprehensive history of mental disabili among the Justices from the
Court's establishment through the 1990s. This Article rejects Garrow's
advocacy of mandatory retirement as both under- and
over-inclusive-that is, it would miss some cases of mental decrepitude and it
69. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 839 ("Admittedly, even given an eighteen-year term, some Justices could still become
mentally or physically decrepit during their tenure and continue to serve on the Court." (footnote
omitted)).
70. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 54, at 5 ("[A mandatory retirement age of 70] removes
judges who would become incompetent after age 70, but it also removes judges who would
remain competent after age 70 and does not remove judges who became incompetent before age
70. These false positive and false negative costs may well be high.").
71. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 16, at 263.
72. Id
73. A relevant disability is that which substantially limits the Supreme Court Justice's
performance of the essential functions of his or her job. See infra note 349.
74. Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2006)).
75. See, e.g., WARD, supra note 53, at 247-48; Richard A. Epstein, Mandatory Retirement
for Supreme Court Justices, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES, supra note 9, at 415, 433; Garrow, supra note 57, at 1085-86.
76. See generally Garrow, supra note 57; see supra note 57 (detailing the different ways in
which Garrow defines mental decrepitude in the context of his historical account).
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would force out highly functioning Justices simply because of age. This
Article also flags concern for the potential effects of mandatory retirement on
judicial independence, impartiality, and integrity. Nevertheless, in recognition
of the seriousness of the mental disability concern, this Article recommends
that all Article II judges, not just Supreme Court Justices, be encouraged
toward earlier voluntary retirement and that the Supreme Court adopt a formal
mechanism, comparable to the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, to monitor
and address debilitating disabilities among the Justices, age-related or
otherwise.77
Professor Artemus Ward, like Garrow, has written in favor of mandatory
retirement of Supreme Court Justices at age seventy-five out of concern for
mental decrepitude. 78  In addition to decrepitude, Ward grounds his
mandatory-retirement recommendation in concern for strategic retirement and
the belief that mandatory retirement promotes judicial independence better
than does life tenure.7 9 A number of commentators, including Garrow,80
however, have disputed the strategic-retirement hypothesis, ' with Ward
himself declaring that "the single most important factor for justices deciding to
leave [sic] U.S. Supreme Court is the presence of a formal retirement provision
with generous benefits." 82
As for the argument that mandatory retirement promotes judicial
independence, Ward does not develop this point other than to assert in
conclusion:
Ironically, judicial independence would be strengthened by
mandatory retirement. One only has to think of Franklin Roosevelt's
Court-packing assault on the Court to see how vulnerable the justices
are to manipulation by the other branches of government. A
mandatory retirement age would largely insulate the justices from
accusations that either they are too old to keep up with the workload,
or that they are hanging on to their seats for partisan reasons.
Ward's conclusion that mandatory retirement promotes judicial independence
is thus premised on the idea that mandatory retirement safeguards judges from
criticism on the grounds of infirmity or partisanship. Safeguarding judges
from criticism, however, does not necessarily promote judicial independence
because independence relates to the courts' autonomy vis-d-vis other branches
of government and to individual judges' ability to decide cases free from fear
or favor. 84 Neither institutional nor individual independence is necessarily
77. See infra Part III.A.
78. WARD, supra note 53, passim.
79. Id at 23-24, 240-48.
80. Garrow, supra note 42, at 276-77.
81. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
82. WARD, supra note 53, at 225.
83. Id. at 247.
84. See infra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
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harmed by this type of criticism, and mandatory retirement does not bolster
courts' and judges' ability to withstand criticism or exercise independent
judgment.
Professor Richard Epstein has written in support of mandatory retirement at
age seventy and fixed terms of service for the Supreme Court, whether
introduced together or separately.85 Epstein's recommendations are premised
in large part on concern for the effects of aging, as there comes a
point-approximately at age seventy-where "the traits of wisdom and
experience are likely to be overshadowed by a general decline in fitness,
energy and innovative ability."86 Beyond that, Epstein asserts that the Court
must be subject to "some restriction on the length of service" because it
exercises monopoly power over constitutional interpretation.87
Lastly, Farnsworth has found the case for age-limit proposals "somewhat
stronger" than for fixed-term proposals,88 though he has been highly critical of
fixed-term proposals.89 Although Farnsworth perceives the strongest argument
for age limits to be concern for mental decrepitude,90 he is quick to note that
there "are some arguments against them as well." 91 These counterarguments
include: (1) "the problem of decrepitude is less serious than it sounds," 92
constituting only one to two percent of the "nine-hundred man-years" of
Supreme Court service in the twentieth century;93 and (2) the decrepitude
problem-to the extent it exists-is mitigated by the fact that Justices sit with
eight colleagues and have law clerks, who "keep a chambers running without a
drop-off in quality remotely commensurate with the justice's drop-off in
functionality." 94  Further responding to the mental-decrepitude concern,
Farnsworth emphasizes the danger of Justices being "push[ed] . . . out of office
while they still are lucid and thus creat[ing] a risk that they will use their time
at the Court to angle for attractive situations afterwards." 95 For Farnsworth,
this presents an actual or apparent threat to judicial impartiality, integrity, and
independence because the decisional autonomy of individual Justices may be,
or appear to be, compromised by their interest in post-bench employment.
85. Epstein, supra note 75, at 419-20, 433.
86. Id. at 423.
87. Id. at 433.
88. Farnsworth, supra note 16, at 251.
89. See supra notes 32-33, 39-44 and accompanying text.
90. Farnsworth, supra note 16, at 262.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id at 262-63. Farnsworth does acknowledge the concern with this latter practice. Id. at
262.
95. Id. at 263.
96. Id. ("It need not be a question of bad faith; the greater hazard is a subtle bias reminding
its holder that letting down one's friends now can have disappointing professional consequences
later.").
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Farnsworth also notes concern for strategic retirement as a rationale for
imposing age limits. 9 7 Acknowledging that "[t]here is convincing statistical
evidence that [strategic retirement] occurs" and that strategic retirement
weakens the case for life tenure,98 Farnsworth nevertheless states that it is
"hard to say" how often it occurs.99 As a result, Farnsworth concludes that it is
not at all clear how serious a problem strategic retirement is. 00
C. Return to Practice
Finally, there is a surprising dearth of scholarship on the merits of
prohibiting former Article III judges from returning to practice following
resignation or retirement. Stras and Scott briefly reference the threat to judicial
independence posed by currently serving Justices considering post-bench
employment as yet another factor supporting life tenure over fixed terms or
mandatory retirement. 10  Vicki Jackson notes that a post-employment
prohibition (or minimum age requirement for appointment) might preclude the
issue of 'udges using "judgeship[s] as stepping stone[s]" to more lucrative
careers. Although Associate Historian and later-Professor Emily Field Van
Tassel and her associates provide a detailed historical account of why Article
III judges have resigned from the bench, including return to practice,1 0 3
Professor Ronald Rotunda provides the only extended treatment of the ethical
rules and case law governing judges' post-bench employment inquiries,' 0 4
though Rotunda is focused on whether a sitting federal judge (John Roberts)
was required to recuse himself from a case involving the President (Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld 05) while under consideration for elevation to the Supreme Court.106
97. Id. at 264-65.
98. Id at 264.
99. Id
100. Id.
101. Stras & Scott, supra note 15, at 1425 ("Even fixed, nonrenewable terms . . . would
introduce incentives for Supreme Court Justices to cast votes in a way that improves their
prospects for future employment outside the judiciary.").
102. Jackson, supra note 9, at 1002 n.156 (noting the particular utility of these approaches in
the case of non-renewable term service).
103. EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL ET AL., FED. JUD. CTR., WHY JUDGES RESIGN: INFLUENCES
ON JUDICIAL RETIREMENT SERVICE, 1789 TO 1992 (1993) [hereinafter FJC REPORT], available at
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/judgeres.pdf; Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and
Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service-and Disservice-] 789-1992, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 333, 355-64 (1993) [hereinafter Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals]; see generally
Charles T. Fenn, Note, Supreme Court Justices: Arguing Before the Court After Resigning from
the Court, 84 GEO. L.J. 2473 (1996) (highlighting six former Supreme Court Justices who argued
before the Court after stepping down from its bench).
104. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Propriety of a Judge's Failure to Recuse When Being
Consideredfor Another Position, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1187, 1190-96 (2006).
105. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 1002
(2005), rev'd 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
106. Rotunda, supra note 104, at 1188.
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This Article seeks to prompt a wider discussion of these issues by
recommending a prohibition on former Article III judges (including Justices)
returning to practice.'07
II. JUDICIAL RETIREMENT AND RETURN-TO-PRACTICE RULES AND
CONVENTIONS FOR ARTICLE III AND ENGLISH AND WELSH HIGHER
JUDICIARIES
A. Life Tenure for Article III Judges
Article III judges have enjoyed life tenure without mandatory retirement
since the time of the Constitution's adoption.108 The Constitutional
Convention debates and the Federalist Papers reflect a strong commitment to
security of tenure during good behavior for Article III judges,109 drawing on
the perceived wisdom of Britain's then-relatively new guarantee of tenure
during good behavior for its higher judiciary. 1o Both the Virginia and New
Jersey plans for the Constitution proposed judicial tenure during good
behavior, and both proposals were endorsed by Convention delegates."
Thereafter, tenure in good behavior was included in many of the various draft
constitutions prepared after the Great Compromise was reached,1 12 including
107. See infra Part III.B.
108. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
109. Hamilton described "good behavior" variously in the Federalist Papers as having "the
requisite integrity" and "requisite knowledge," being of "fit character," and being "qualified to
conduct [judicial office] with utility and dignity." THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471-72
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
110. See, e.g., id at 472 ("The experience of Great Britain affords an illustrious comment on
the excellence of the institution [ofjudicial life tenure]."). Hamilton and his contemporaries were
inspired by Britain's 1701 Act of Settlement and the then-recent 1760 Commissions and Salaries
of Judges Act. See id.; infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
111. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20-22 & n.10 (James
Madison) (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (recounting the Virginia Plan-presented by Edmund
Randolph-as containing resolution (9), which states "that a National Judiciary be established to
consist of one or more supreme tribunals ... to hold their offices during good behaviour"); id at
121 (reporting on the proceedings of June 5, 1787 and noting that the delegates agreed to Virginia
resolution (9) on judicial tenure during good behavior); id. at 244 (recounting the proceedings of
June 15, 1787, during which William Patterson presented the New Jersey Plan, containing
resolution (5) "that a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a supreme Tribunal the Judges
of which . . . to hold their offices during good behavior"); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 44 (James Madison) (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (recounting the
proceedings of July 18, 1787, in which the delegates agreed to New Jersey resolution (5) on
judicial tenure during good behavior).
112. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 111, at 15-16
(James Madison) (reporting on the Great Compromise on equal representation of the states in the
Senate, which was reached on July 16, 1787). The draft constitutions providing for judicial
tenure in good behavior include Committee of Detail, I, (Resolution 8 specifically establishes
tenure in good behavior), see id. at 131-32 (Committee of Detail), Committee of Detail, III,
(Section 15 requires that the proposed federal judicial court be comprised of judges "appointed
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the final draft constitution approved by the Convention.113
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton strongly supported the
Constitution's guarantee of judicial tenure during good behavior in their
Federalist Papers.114  According to Madison, respectable opinion and the
practice in most states supported the choice of tenure during good behavior.'
Hamilton likewise observed that tenure during good behavior reflected the
wise and dominant practice in the states, declaring that "[t]he standard of good
behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy is certainly
one of the most valuable of the modem improvements in the practice of
government."ll 6 Not only is it an "excellent barrier to the encroachments and
oppressions of the representative body," but Hamilton declared it to be "the
best expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady,
upright, and impartial administration of the laws."' 17 Life tenure was
understood as essential to judicial independence, integrity, and impartiality.
Decisional independence could not be expected of judges with temporary
appointments," and anything less than life tenure would undermine the
government's ability to appoint the most qualified judges, given the sacrifice
involved in leaving profitable law practices for the bench.120
Hamilton specifically rejected the mandatory-retirement rule in his home
state's constitution, writing:
The constitution of New York, to avoid investigations that must
forever be vague and dangerous, has taken a particular age as the
criterion of inability. No man can be a judge beyond sixty. I believe
there are few at present who do not disapprove of this provision.
There is no station, in relation to which it is less proper than to that
of a judge.121
Dismissing mandatory retirement in part because he understood judges to
retain their mental faculties longer than other men,122 Hamilton's rejection of
New York's mandatory-retirement rule was also informed by the absence of a
during good Behaviour"), see id. at 136, Committee of Detail, IV (Resolution 5, clause 5 states
that "judges shall hold their offices during good behaviour"), see id at 146, and Committee of
Detail, IX (Section 14 allows for judicial tenure during good behavior), see id at 172.
113. Id. at 651, 660.
114. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 109, at 242 (James Madison); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 109, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton).
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 109, at 242 (James Madison).
116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 109, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).
117. Id.
118. Id at 469.
119. Id. at 470-71.
120. Id. at 470.
121. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 109, at 474 (Alexander Hamilton).
122. Id
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pension for Article III judges.123 Hamilton believed that judges, as public
servants dependent on their salaries, should not be dismissed without provision
for their financial security simply because they had become "super
annuated."1 24
Since the Founding era, mandatory retirement has been the subject of
constitutional-amendment proposals on at least six occasions: four in the
nineteenth century and two in the twentieth. 125 Although Congress did not
pass any of the proposed amendments, 126 an 1869 proposal for mandatory
retirement of Article III judges may well have contributed to that year's
enactment of the first-ever judicial pension, 127 the availability of which
increased the likelihood that judges would voluntarily retire.128 The 1869 Act
introduced the "Rule of 80," as it granted Article III judges a pension "equal
to their annual salary at the time of retirement, so long as they had reached the
age of seventy and served at least ten years." 30
Then, in 1937, a proposed amendment mandating that Supreme Court
Justices retire at the age of seventy-five became a major alternative to
Roosevelt's "'Court packing' plan."131 This proposed amendment was joined
by at least three others that would also have required mandatory retirement for
federal judges at age seventy or seventy-five, with retirement at seventy-five
123. See id Pensions for Article III judges were not introduced until 1869. Judiciary Act of
1869, 16 Stat. 44; see Richard L. Vining et al., Judicial Tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court,
1790-1868: Frustration, Resignation, and Expiration on the Bench, 20 STUD. AM. POL. DEV.
198, 200 (2006) (discussing judicial-tenure patterns in the pre-pension era).
124. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 109, at 474-75 (Alexander Hamilton).
125. FJC REPORT, supra note 103, at 37-39; Garrow, supra note 57, at 1023-26
& nn.134-49, 1034-35 & n.198; Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 103, at
396-400.
126. Kentucky Senator John Pope proposed the first amendment mandating retirement at age
sixty-five in 1809, New Hampshire Representative Nehemiah Eastman proposed the second
amendment in 1826, which mandated retirement at seventy, a third amendment was proposed in
1836, which mandated retirement at sixty-five, and Representative James Ashley proposed a
fourth amendment in 1869, which mandated twenty-year term limits and mandatory retirement at
seventy. Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 103, at 396-97.
127. Act ofApr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 5, 16 Stat. 44, 45 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 371(a) (2006)).
128. Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 103, at 396-97; see also Stras
& Scott, supra note 15, at 1440 (indicating that the "1869 Act seemed to have its intended effect"
as it prompted judges to retire voluntarily); Richard L. Vining, Jr., Judicial Departures and the
Introduction of Qualified Retirement, 1982-1953, 30 JusT. SYS. J. 139, 145, 151 (2009)
("Pension eligibility strongly encouraged voluntary departures.").
129. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 453, 460 (2007) (noting that the rule applied to judges who were at least sixty-five, if their
age plus years serving as a judge equaled eighty or more).
130. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 5, 16 Stat. at 45.
131. Garrow, supra note 57, at 996; see id at 1023 (noting that Nebraska Senator Edward R.
Burke proposed a constitutional amendment requiring mandatory retirement at age seventy-five
just days after Roosevelt's announcement).
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gaining the greatest support.132 Although the mandatory retirement proposals
failed, largely due to Roosevelt's lack of support,1 3 3 Supreme Court Justices
were authorized for the first time that year to retire with senior status, 34 which,
as with the availability of pensions, increased the likelihood that they would
retire voluntarily. Article III judges below the Supreme Court level had
been authorized to retire on senior status beginning in 1919.136 In 1939,
Congress authorized voluntary retirement on the basis of disability for all
Article III judges.' 3 7 Full salary was provided to judges with ten or more years
of service who retired due to disability, regardless of their age at retirement. 38
Between 1946 and 1955, American bar leaders conducted a major campaign
to adopt a constitutional amendment mandating that Supreme Court Justices
retire at seventy-five.139 This, like the 1937 proposed amendments, failed to be
adopted, 140 but Congress responded in 1948 by providing that any salary
increases for active Article III judges would also apply to senior judges,
further encouraging voluntary retirement. In 1954, judges with fifteen years of
service were authorized to retire at age sixty-five.142
In the late 1970s, there was one more "significant but . . . unsuccessful"
attempt to introduce mandatory retirement-this time by statute. 143  This
attempt was followed by enactment of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
of 1980, introducing self-monitoring and redress of judicial misconduct and
132. Id at 1023-26 (discussing proposals from Democratic Florida Senator Charles 0.
Andrews, Democratic Louisiana Senator Allen Ellender, and Democratic California Senator
William G. McAdoo).
133. Id. at 1019-20, 1026.
134. Retirement Act of 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 371(b)-(c) (2006)).
135. See Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 103, at 395-98 (discussing
Congress's attempts to encourage retirement).
136. See Act of Feb. 25, 1919, ch. 29, § 6, 40 Stat. 1156, 1157 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 37 1(b), (e)). Senior status enables a judge to retire on full salary with regular salary
increases, while continuing to hear cases on a reduced-volume basis; it also enables the President
to nominate a full-time judge to fill the vacancy. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)-(e).
137. See Act of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 433, 53 Stat. 1204 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 372).
138. Act of Aug. 5, 1939, § 3, 53 Stat. at 1205. Half salary was provided to those retiring on
a disability with less than ten years of service, again regardless of age at retirement. Id.
139. Garrow, supra note 57, at 1028-43.
140. Id. at 1034-38 & nn.196, 198.
141. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 371, 62 Stat. 869, 903 (codified as amended at
U.S.C. § 371(b)(1)) (providing that judges taking senior status shall receive "the salary of the
office" for the remainder of their lives).
142. Act of Feb. 20, 1954, ch. 6, sec. 4(a), § 371, 68 Stat. 8, 12.
143. Dan M. McGill, Disincentives to Resignation of Disciplined Federal Judges in the
Benefits Package of the Federal Judiciary, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 1221, 1224 (1993); see also Garrow,
supra note 57, at 1059-60 & n.361 (recounting Georgia Senator Sam Nunn's introduction of
Judicial Tenure Act, which was to apply to all federal judges).
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disability for lower federal court judges.1 44  Lastly, in 1984, Congress
expanded judicial retirement provisions still further by enabling retirement
pursuant to a sliding scale of age (sixty-five to seventy) and Article III service
(fifteen to ten years), as long as age and service totaled at least eighty. 145
Today, an Article III judge contemplating retirement has two choices,
assuming that he or she satisfies the "Rule of 80." He or she can retire
altogether, receive an annuity equal to the salary he or she earned in his or her
last year as a judge, and return to law practice if he or she chooses.146
Alternatively, he or she can retire on senior status, continue to hear cases,
create a judicial vacancy for the president to fill, receive the same judicial
salary as if in active service (with regular salary increases), but cannot return to
law practice. 47
To complete the historical picture, in addition to the mandatory-retirement
proposals and voluntary-retirement provisions that followed, there was a series
of proposed amendments to replace life tenure with term limits in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Van Tassel reported that "18
legislative amendments proposed between 1807 and 1879 would have limited
judicial terms in office, with the limits ranging from 4 to 20 years." 48
Professor Michael Mazza, like Van Tassel, recounted a host of proposed
amendments that introduced term limits for Article III judges in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,149 including some that "mandated
limits for all federal judges; the others only capped the service of judges on the
inferior courts."150 According to Mazza, these term-limit proposals "garnered
more support than did efforts for an elected judiciary," s5 which was also
debated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.152 None of the
term-limit proposals succeeded in Congress, however.1
53
144. Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364).
145. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, sec.
204, 98 Stat. 333, 350 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 371(c)).
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(a).
147. Id. § 371(b), (d). 28 U.S.C. § 454 prohibits currently serving federal judges, including
senior judges, from practicing law, providing, "Any justice or judge appointed under the authority
of the United States who engages in the practice of law is guilty of a high misdemeanor." 28
U.S.C. § 454.
148. Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 103, at 396 n.291.
149. Mazza, supra note 9, at 143-47.
150. Id at 147.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Renee Lettow Lerner, From Popular Control to Independence: Reform of the
Elected Judiciary in Boss Tweed's New York, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 109, 113-14 (2007); Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise ofJudicial Elections and Judicial Review,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1061 app. A at 1146 (2010).
153. Mazza, supra note 9, at 147.
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B. Return to Practice by Former Article III Judges
Just as there is no mandatory retirement for, or term limits on, Article III
judges, there is no bar on Article III judges returning to practice after resigning
or retiring from the bench.154 Indeed, substantial numbers of Article III judges
have returned to practice following resignation or retirement, both historically
and recently. 155
Emily Field Van Tassel's studies, Resignations and Removals: A History of
Federal Judicial Service-and Disservice-] 789-1992 and Why Judges
Resign: Influences on Federal Judicial Service, 1789 to 1992 examine Article
III judges' reasons for resigning from the bench between 1789 and 1992.156 Of
the 2627 Article III judges who served during that period,157 Van Tassel found
that only seven percent, or 190 judges, had resigned for stated reasonsis other
than age or health.159 Van Tassel included disability and retirement between
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (containing no restrictions on a retiring judge's return to
practice).
155. See infra apps. A, B.
156. See FJC REPORT, supra note 103; Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note
103. Although the two publications are substantially the same, this Article primarily references
the Resignations and Removals article published in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
because it is the latter of the two publications (and would, presumably, reflect any updates made
to the text or data). See Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 103, at 333 author
footnote (noting that "an earlier version of this Article was prepared as a report to the National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, while [Van Tassel] was Associate Historian
with the Federal Judicial History Office of the Federal Judicial Center"). However, this Article
references the Federal Judicial Center report for judicial biographical information because its
appendix includes much more detailed information about the judges who resigned than does the
University ofPennsylvania Law Review article.
157. Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 103, at 345. Van Tassel indicated
that the 2627 total "was calculated by counting the number of appointments per President"). Id.
at 345 n.44. This total appeared to include both Supreme Court Justices and lower Article III
judges. See FJC REPORT, supra note 103, at 75 (listing the resignation of Associate Justice Abe
Fortas).
158. Although Van Tassel indicates in her text that she looked to former judges' stated
reasons for resigning, she indicates in her footnotes that she looked at what judges actually did
post-bench as well as what they had said. Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note
103, at 338, 350 n.62, 352 (explaining that she "speak[s] of 'reasons' for resignation throughout
[her] Article for the sake of convenience, but it might be more accurate to say 'reasons judges
have offered for resigning, or what they have done after they resigned"'). Van Tassel recognized
that the Article Ill judges in her study may have left the bench for multiple reasons and may not
have been fully candid in stating their reasons. Id. at 338 ("Where the cause [of why the federal
judge left the bench] is not clear, the study indicates the reasons that judges have offered for their
departures, although at times these may have been misleading or incomplete.").
159. Id. at 338, 345. At the outset of the FJC report, Van Tassel et al. note that the "study
focuses on the 188 judges" who resigned between 1789 and 1992 for reasons other than age or
health. FJC REPORT, supra note 103, at 2. Later in the FJC report, they refer to 184 federal
judges (out of 2627) that left the bench for reasons other than age or health. Id. at 7. Despite the
numerical difference between Van Tassel's two publications-190 in the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review article and 188 and 184 in the FJC report-the appendices to both list
291 judges as having resigned between 1789 and 1992, with 101 of the 291 resigning for reasons
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1869 and 1919 within the category of "age or health."' 60  More relevantly to
this Article's focus on return to practice, Van Tassel found that less than five
percent of the 2627 judges who served between 1789 and 1992 had resigned to
take other employment. 61 When viewed in this light-as a percentage of the
total number of Article III judges serving across time-the return-to-other-
employment rate appears small. When viewed as a percentage of those who
resigned from the bench, however, the return-to-other-employment rate
appears much more significant, constituting one-half of the resignees in the
1789-1992 period (and more than that in the 1993-2010 period), as detailed
below.
Why Judges Resign, authored by Van Tassel with Beverly Hudson Wirtz and
Peter Wonders for the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), contains an appendix that
sets forth details on the Article III service, termination date and reason, and
post-service activities of the 291 judges who Van Tassel, Wirtz, and Wonders
designated as having resigned between 1789 and 1992.162 Of the 291 judges
listed in the appendix, 190 were identified as having resigned for reasons other
than ae or health (again, including disability and retirement between 1869 and
1919). 6 In examining the information contained in the FJC Report, I found
of age or health, leaving 190 judges in each appendix resigning for reasons other than age or
health. See id. app. 2 at 129-32; Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 103, at 420
tbl.2. In referencing Van Tassel's findings, this Article uses this 190 figure as the number of
judges who resigned for reasons other than age or health between 1789 and 1992.
160. Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 103, at 352. Thus, Van Tassel
included only the retirees who retired pursuant to the antecedent to 28 U.S.C. § 371(a)-the Act
of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 5, 16 Stat. 44, 45-which was in effect between 1869 (when the
legislature first introduced retirement pensions for those satisfying the then-applicable "Rule of
80") and 1919 (when the legislature introduced senior status for the lower Article III judiciary).
See supra note 160. In her study, Van Tassel does not include (a) judges who retired pursuant to
§ 371(a) after 1919, nor (b) judges who "retired" (in the non-371(a) sense of the term) from
Article III service (and all other gainful employment) before the 1869 Act. However, Van Tassel
may well have included individuals in this second group in her category of judges resigning for
reasons of "age or health," including disability.
Of note, Van Tassel classified the reasons for judges' resignations "into five major
categories: (I) age and/or health; (2) appointment to other office or pursuit of elected office; (3)
dissatisfaction; (4) return to private practice, other employment, inadequate salary; and (5)
allegations of misbehavior (including impeachments and convictions)." Van Tassel, Resignations
and Removals, supra note 103, at 351-52.
161. Id at 364 ("The primary reason for resignation outside of age or health is alternative
employment.").
162. FJC REPORT, supra note 103, app.
163. See id Of the 291 former judges included in the appendix to the FJC Report, Van
Tassel et al. identified 55 judges as having retired, 40 as having resigned for reasons of age or
health, and 6 as having resigned on account of disability-leaving 190 judges who resigned for
reasons other than "age or health." See id. By comparison, in Table 2 of the appendix to her
University of Pennsylvania Law Review article, Van Tassel lists 56 judges as having retired, 39 as
having resigned for reasons of age or health, and 6 as having resigned on account of
disability-also leaving 190 judges who resigned for reasons other than "age or health." See Van
Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 103, app. at 408 tbl.1.
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that 96, or 50.53%, of these 190 judges had returned to practice at some point
following their bench service.' For purposes of this analysis, I defined
"practice" as work as a lawyer or lawyer-consultant 165 in the public or private
sector, not including work as a neutral arbitrator or mediator. I included all
judges who had returned to practice at some point after resigning from the
bench because law practice by former judges-whether immediately upon
resignation or later-raises concerns for actual or perceived compromise of
judicial independence, impartiality, and integrity.
I note that my calculation of ninety-six resigned Article III judges returning
to practice is less than what Van Tassel found to be the number of resignees
pursuing other employment, including return to practice, between 1789 and
1992. Although stated as a percentage of judges rather than an absolute
number, Van Tassel's finding that "less than five percent" of all Article III
judges who served between 1789 and 1992 had pursued post-bench
employment, including law practice,1 translates into approximately (though
"less than") 131 judges, more than the 96 whom I identified as having returned
to practice from the appendix to the FJC Report.167 The difference in number
can be explained by Van Tassel's inclusion of former judges who obtained
other governmental appointments, including executive-branch appointments
and state-court appointments, or who ran for elected positions, in addition to
those who returned to practice.168 Approaching the ninety-six judges who
returned to practice as a percentage of Article III judges serving between 1789
and 1992, I found a 3.65% return-to-practice rate for this period, compared
with a "less than five percent" rate for those pursuing other employment over
the same period.169
To complement Van Tassel's 1789-1992 study, specifically regarding return
to practice, I compiled a list of all Article III judges who had resigned between
January 1, 1993 and December 31, 2010 and examined these judges' post-
164. See infra app. A. The names and post-bench affiliations of the ninety-six Article III
judges who returned to practice at some point after resigning between 1789 and 1992 is included
in Appendix A. Because the 190 resignees for reasons other than "age or health" included 15
judges who resigned during the Civil War out of loyalty to the Confederacy, a second return-to-
practice rate was calculated for the 1789 to 1992 resignees that excluded the Confederate
resignees. Excluding all those who had resigned for reasons of age, health, disability, retirement
(1869-1919), and loyalty to the Confederacy, left 175 Article Ill resignees, of whom 91, or
52.00%, returned to practice (public or private) at some point following resignation from the
bench. See infra app. A (designating with an asterisk those who resigned to return to the
Confederacy and thereafter also returned to practice).
165. There did not appear to be any former Article Ill judges who were designated as having
resigned for reasons other than "age or health" acting as lawyer-consultants during this period.
Id.
166. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
167. FJC REPORT, supra note 103, app. at 52.
168. Id.
169. See infra app. A; see supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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bench activities to determine the contemporary return-to-practice rate. 70
Sixty-six percent of the 1993-2010 resignees-twenty-one of
thirty-two-returned to practice. For retirees during this period, I found that
40.66%-thirty-seven of ninety-one-returned to practice. Combining the
data, 47.15%-58 of 123-of Article III judges who resigned or retired
between 1993 and 2010 returned to practice at some point following their
bench service. 17  To conduct this analysis, I used the Federal Judicial Center's
judicial biographical database to determine who resigned and who retired
(pursuant to § 371(a), not senior status 72) during this period. I then examined
public sources to determine post-bench return to practice. As above, I defined
"practice" as work as a lawyer or lawyer-consultant in the public or private
sector, but not as a neutral arbitrator or mediator. To avoid overstating the
return-to-practice rate, any uncertainty about whether a former judge had
returned to practice caused that judge to be treated as not having returned. As
a result, my data may understate the return-to-practice rates for judges
resigning and retiring between 1993 and 2010.17
In concluding this analysis, I note that the return-to-practice rate as a
percentage of resigning judges was fifty percent between 1789 and 1992 (or
fifty-two percent, if the Confederate resignees are excluded) and sixty-six
percent between 1993 and 2010.174 I urge caution, however, in comparing the
170. See infra app. B (detailing this author's methodology and findings).
171. Id.
172. I excluded senior judges because they may still hear cases and are therefore barred from
practice. See 28 U.S.C. § 37 1(b) (2006); supra note 147 and accompanying text.
173. Returning to Van Tassel's framework of analyzing the data in terms of
percentage of the total number of Article III judges serving during the relevant period, I
determined that the total number of Article III judges serving between 1993 and 2010
was 1811. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/export.html (last visited July 19, 2011). This figure
includes Supreme Court Justices and counts judges who were elevated to another Article Ill court
during this time as one judge, rather than two judicial appointments. Of these 1811 judges, 21 (of
32) resignees returned to practice; in other words, 1.16% of all those serving between 1993 and
2010 resigned and subsequently returned to practice. This is less than the 3.65% who resigned
and returned to practice that I calculated for the 1789-1992 period and less than the under 5%
who resigned to pursue other employment that Van Tassel found for 1789-1992. See supra text
accompanying note 162.
The difference in these percentages may be explained, in part, by the passage of time. Much
of the 1789-1992 time period is remote, resulting in a higher percentage of judges who left the
bench during that period than compared to judges serving during the 1993-2010 period. Stated
otherwise, because the 1993-2010 period is far less remote in time, a far smaller percentage of
the total number of judges serving during this period have left the bench for whatever reason,
including to return to practice. Because changes in judicial-retirement provisions affect the
reasons for and mechanisms by which judges have left the bench over time, caution should be
used when comparing these periods. See Van Tassel, supra note 104, at 398 (acknowledging
difficulties in drawing conclusions about resignation patterns across time, given changes in
judicial retirement provisions).
174. See infra apps. A, B.
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1789-1992 and 1993-2010 resignation data, given intervening changes in
judicial retirement provisions affecting the reasons for, and mechanisms by
which, judges have left the bench.17 5
Turning to the provisions governing former Article III judges' return to
practice today, the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judgesl76 provides that whether a
judge may return to practice, rather than how the judge may conduct his or her
job search, is a matter for states to regulate because it involves a former judge
acting in his or her capacity as a lawyer. Because in many states judges may
be removed from office through elections,178 it is unsurprising that most states
do not prohibit former state court judges from practicing law following bench
service in recognition that some judges will lose their retention or reelection
bids before they are ready to retire from gainful employment. This same
rationale does not apply to life-tenured Article III judges.
Despite the absence of a bar on return to practice in most states, a number of
states place restrictions on how currently serving judges may pursue
post-bench employment. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, made
clear in DeNike v. Cupo that the safest course for judges interested in post-
bench employment is to wait until after their retirement to approach any law
firms, thereby avoiding the actuality and appearance of partiality.' 79  As
another example, Massachusetts does not allow a judge to announce his or her
upcoming affiliation with a law firm when announcing his or her departure
from the bench out of concern that it would lend the prestige of judicial office
to the firm.'so
Although the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges is silent on whether a former
Article III judge may return to practice in recognition that it is a matter for the
states to regulate, the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial
Conference of the United Statesl82 has interpreted the Code as implicitly
175. See supra note 173.
176. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES (2011). The Judicial Conference of the United
States (Judicial Conference), the governing body of the U.S. Courts, adopted the Code of
Conduct, which addresses issues of judicial independence, integrity, and impartiality, among
others. Id Canons 1-2. The Code of Conduct is not self-enforcing or binding on judges. Heather
M. Clark, Note, The Supreme Court's Indecent Proposal: Repealing the Honoraria Prohibition of
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 1475, 1490 (2002). Rather, the Code
provides guidance to judges and can be the subject of complaints lodged with chief circuit judges
pursuant to the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 351 (2006) (outlining the
procedure for filing a complaint against a judge).
177. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3 ("A judge should perform the duties of
the office fairly, impartially and diligently.").
178. Daniel R. Deja, How Judges Are Selected: A Survey of the Judicial Selection Process in
the United States, 75 MICH. BAR J. 904, 905 (1996).
179. 958 A.2d 446, 457 (N.J. 2008).
180. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Supreme Judicial Court, CJE Op. No. 2008-5 (2008).
181. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
182. The Judicial Conference conducts much of its business through committees, including
the Code of Conduct Committee. Organization, U.S. CTs., http://www.uscourts.gov
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allowing former judges to return to practice.183 In an advisory opinion,184 the
Committee interpreted Canon 3,185 which addresses impartiality, as providin
guidance on how judges can conduct post-bench employment inquiries.
More specifically, the Committee's opinion clarified when a judge must recuse
him- or herself from hearing a matter because of his or her post-bench
employment inquiries.' 87 Framed in terms of what explorations a judge may
undertake, the Opinion instructs: "After the initiation of any discussions with a
law firm, no matter how preliminary or tentative the exploration may be, the
judge should recuse on any matter in which the firm appears. Absent such
recusal, a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.,,1ss In
providing guidance on how judges should decide which firms to approach, the
Opinion counsels:
At one extreme, a judge steers far from any impropriety or
appearance of impropriety by negotiating only with firms that have
not appeared before the judge. At the other extreme, a judge should
refrain from negotiating with a firm if the firm's cases before the
court are so frequent and so numerous that the judge's recusal in
those cases (which would be required) would adversely affect the
litigants or would have an impact on the court's ability to handle its
docket. 189
In concluding this section, I note that not all federal judgeships are created
equal when it comes to return-to-practice rules. Although Article III judges do
not lose their retirement annuities upon returning to practice so long as they are
fully retired (i.e., so long as they are not retired on senior status), non-Article
III federal judges lose their retirement annuities if they return to practice. For
/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/organization.aspx (last visited June 18, 2011). As its name
suggests, the Code of Conduct Committee is charged with drafting and amending the Code of
Conduct for U.S. Judges and issuing opinions interpreting the Code in response to judges'
inquiries. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2.
183. See Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. No. 84 (2009), available at
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesandPolicies/conduct/Vol02B-chO2.pdf (addressing the process
of seeking post-judicial employment). *
184. Id The Committee's published advisory opinions are an important resource for
understanding the Code of Conduct, though they, like the Code itself, are not binding. See, e.g.,
Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004).
185. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3 (providing that a judge shall be fair and
impartial at all times and "shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
186. Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. No. 84, supra note 183.
187. Id.
18 8. Id.
189. Id; see also PepsiCo, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasizing
that a judge's failure to recuse himself when his agent contacted firms appearing before him about
potential post-bench employment was a violation of a judge's obligation to act impartially).
190. See 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (remaining silent on the effect of return to legal practice on
an Article III judge's retirement annuity).
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example, former federal bankruptcy and magistrate judges forfeit their
retirement annuity rights if they return to law practice or accept any other
employment with the U.S. government after retiring from the bench. 191
Former Court of Federal Claims judges forfeit their
retirement-annuity rights if they engage in practice against the United States
or, as above, accept any employment with the U.S. government after retiring
from the bench.19 As for how to explain this difference in treatment, it is
almost certainly due in part to the lesser status and lack of constitutional
solicitude afforded non-Article III judges. In the case of Court of Federal
Claims judges, it likely also rests with concern for conflicts of interest arising
from the simultaneous receipt of a retirement annuity from the entity against
which the former judge as lawyer is representing a client.
C. Life Tenure with Mandatory Retirement for Higher Court Judges in
England and Wales
Higher court judges in England and Wales gained some security of tenure
for the first time with the 1701 Act of Settlement's provision for judicial
service during good behavior and removal only by Address (to the monarch)
by both Houses of Parliament.'9 3  In 1760, tenure during good behavior was
assured for the duration of higher court judges' lives, rather than the life of the
monarch appointing them. 4 Then, in 1799, judicial pensions were
191. 28 U.S.C. § 377(m)(1)(A) (providing for forfeiture of retirement annuity for any
bankruptcy or magistrate judge who practices law post-retirement); Id. § 377(m)(3) (requiring
forfeiture of retirement annuity for any bankruptcy or magistrate judge who receives
"compensation for civil office or employment under the United States Government" for the
period in which compensation is received).
192. Id. § 178(j)(1) (providing for forfeiture of retirement annuity rights of retired Court of
Federal Claims judge who "represents (or supervises or directs the representation of) a client in
making any civil claim against the United States or any agency thereof"); Id. § 178(j)(3)
(providing for forfeiture of retirement annuity rights of retired Court of Federal Claims judges
who "accept[] compensation for civil office or employment under the Government of the United
States" for period in which compensation is received).
193. Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3 (Eng.). Before 1701, the king or
queen could dismiss higher court judges for any or no reason, thereby depriving judges of
decisional independence. DIANA WOODHOUSE, THE OFFICE OF THE LORD CHANCELLOR 25-26
(2001).
194. See Commissions and Salaries of Judges Act, 1760, 1 Geo. 3, c.23 (Eng.). Before the
Act, English monarchs could, and did, terminate their predecessors' judges upon their own
elevation to the throne. For example, Anne, on her accession to the throne, called for the
termination of all then-serving judges, despite the 1701 Act's guarantee of tenure in good
behavior. ROBERT STEVENS, THE ENGLISH JUDGES: THEIR ROLE IN THE CHANGING
CONSTITUTION 10-11 (2002); see also JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 656 (2009).
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introduced, providing practical means for voluntary retirement for the first
time.195
Judicial tenure in good behavior remained in effect until the late 1950s. At
that time, the Judicial Pensions Act 1959 introduced mandatory retirement at
age seventy-five for otherwise life-tenured higher court judges in England and
Wales.196 In advocating seventy-five as the age of mandatory retirement, the
1959 Act's sponsors sought to encourage the appointment of younger, more
"in-touch" judges.197 Professor Robert Stevens has observed that the 1950s
bench "surely contained its share of scholarly, fair, and decent men. It also had
more than its share of cantankerous, prejudiced, intimidating, and boorish
judges, constrained by no retirement age."' 8 According to Stevens, the 1950s
was a turning point for English courts insofar as "one could see a slowly
changing attitude to judicial decision-making," including greater creativity and
engagement with public policy. 199 In defining this turning point as the decade
between 1955 and 1965, Stevens and Abel-Smith observed that, in "1955 it
seemed as if the judges and the law . . . were becoming increasingly irrelevant
to the operation of the modem state." 200 Continuing, Stevens and Abel-Smith
noted that "during the decade which began in 1955, there was a halt in
declining importance of the judiciary, and a greater attempt to analyse the role
of judges in a modem democracy."20I
According to Stevens and Abel-Smith, it was Lord Kilmuir, as Lord
Chancellor between 1954 and 1962, who "restore[d] power to the courts." 202
Stevens and Abel-Smith argue that the introduction of the retirement rule and
subsequent expansion of the judiciary203 were integral to Kilmuir's efforts to
increase the courts' capacity to respond to the social needs of the day by
195. DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL BENCH IN ENGLAND 1727-1875: THE RESHAPING OF A
PROFESSIONAL ELITE 124-25 (1982) (finding that the establishment of the pension system
largely achieved the desired results by encouraging judges to retire rather than die in office).
196. Judicial Pensions Act, 1959, 8 Eliz. 2, c. 9, § 2 (U.K.). The Act was applied
prospectively. ROBERT STEVENS, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY: THE VIEW FROM THE
LORD CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE 89, 167 (1993).
197. STEVENS, supra note 196, at 167; see also STEVENS, supra note 194, at 37-39.
198. STEVENS, supra note 194, at 37.
199. Id. at 34-35.
200. BRIAN ABEL-SMITH & ROBERT STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS: A
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 1750-1965, at 293-94, 299 (1967).
201. Id at 294.
202. Id
203. The number of High Court and Court of Appeal judgeships in the 1950s was
approximately one-third of what it was in 2002. STEVENS, supra note 194, at 37. Lord Kilmuir
successfully petitioned Parliament to expand the judiciary in 1960, enabling him to appoint an
unprecedented number ofjudges. See, e.g., ABEL-SMITH & STEVENS, supra note 200, at 269-71.
8712011]
Catholic University Law Review
engaging more deeply in the shaping of public policy,204 as Kilmuir sought to
make the courts "more relevant and less formalistic." os
Kilmuir also attributed his support for mandatory retirement to concern for
older judges' competence, explaining, "senescence is too difficult for anyone
to judge for themselves." 206 A 1956 Economist article echoed this sentiment,
observing that "judges were allowed to continue 'in a job which requires the
keenest faculties at an age when other men are deemed suitable only for some
gentle gardening."'207 Before the 1959 Act, Lord Chancellors and Lords Chief
Justice expended considerable effort, according to Stevens, "eas[ing] out those
who were past their prime."208
The 1993 Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act (1993 Act) reduced the
mandatory retirement age from seventy-five to seventy-albeit granting the
Lord Chancellor discretion to extend individual judges' service to
209
seventy-five. It also expanded the number of judicial offices subject to
mandatory retirement210 and increased the length of service required for
judicial-pension eligibility from fifteen to twenty years.211 By increasing the
pension-eligibility requirement at the same time that it reduced the mandatory
retirement age, the 1993 Act significantly limited the pool of candidates
willing to be considered for judicial office, as some lawyers were disinclined,
or thought themselves unable, to leave lucrative law practices for judgeships as
early as age fifty, which would be necessary to qualify for pensions upon
mandatory retirement at age seventy.2 12
204. See STEVENS, supra note 194, at 34 (quoting Kilmuir calling for law to be used "in the
solution of the great problems of a modem state," including those related to regulation of business
competition); STEVENS, supra note 196, at 166-67.
205. STEVENS, supra note 194, at 39-40. Exemplary of this change, Kilmuir as Lord
Chancellor oversaw the appointment of Law Lords, who viewed "the law-making function of
judges" as "'obvious."' ABEL-SMITH & STEVENS, supra note 200, at 297.
206. VISCOUNT KILMUIR, POLITICAL ADVENTURE: THE MEMOIRS OF THE EARL OF KILMUIR
299, 302 (1964).
207. Judges Summed Up, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 1956, at 947, cited in KILMUIR, supra
note 206, at 302.
208. STEVENS, supra note 196, at 89.
209. Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act, 1993, c. 8, § 26 (U.K.). Some scholars have
criticized the provision that empowered the Lord Chancellor to exercise discretion in extending
individual judges' terms as a threat to judicial independence. See, e.g., KATE MALLESON, THE
NEW JUDICIARY: THE EFFECTS OF EXPANSION AND ACTIVISM 213-14 (1999).
210. Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act, 1993, c. 8, sch. 5, § 26 (U.K.). The 1993
schedule contained more than three pages of affected offices, whereas the 1959 Act had only a
single paragraph of affected positions. Id; Judicial Pensions Act, 1959, 8 Eliz. 2, c. 9, sch. I
(U.K.).
211. Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act, 1993, c. 8, § 3 (U.K.).
212. See Roger Trapp, Bringing Judges into the Real World, INDEPENDENT,
Apr. 5, 1995, http://www.independent.co.uk/money/spend-save/bringing-judges-into-the-real-
world-1614280.html (discussing the potential disincentive of becoming a judge when, in order to
receive a pension, one must be on the bench by age fifty).
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That the mandatory retirement age was lowered, rather than raised,
thirty-four years after its first enactment, despite people living and working
longer, is a bit curious, but can be explained, in part, by some of the Act's
proponents' interest in increasing judicial diversity. 13 Whether the Act would
actually further judicial diversity was contested at the time and remains largely
unrealized today.214 As Professor Kate Malleson notes, the average age of the
higher court judiciary has decreased only modestly following the adoption of
215the mandatory-retirement rules, and diversification by sex, race, and
ethnicity has been even more modest,216 principally concentrated at the lower
213. 215 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1992) 425-87 (U.K.). In the early 1990s, there was
one woman and no racial minorities on the Court of Appeal, and three women and one racial
minority on the High Court. STEVENS, supra note 196, at 177; see also infra note 217 (discussing
current statistics on women and racial and ethnic minorities on the English and Welsh bench).
214. See Kate Malleson, Diversity in the Judiciary: The Case for Positive Action, 36 J.L.
& SOC'Y 376, 378-79 (2009); see also SELECT COMMITrEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, MEETING
WITH THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE LORD CHANCELLOR REPORT, 2010-11, H.L. 89, at
56-57 (U.K.) [hereinafter MEETING WITH THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE CHANCELLOR
REPORT]. Questioning the Lord Chancellor, Lord Pannick observed that the senior judiciary
remained composed primarily of white males and posited that public confidence in the judiciary
may wane as a result. MEETING WITH THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE CHANCELLOR REPORT,
supra, at 56.
215. See, e.g., MALLESON, supra note 209, at 104 ("The introduction of a mandatory
retirement age has removed the very old from the bench but the age profile of the senior judges is
still heavily weighted to late middle age and early old age.").
216. The Ministry of Justice reports that the 2010 composition of the English and Welsh
judiciary was 20.6% female and 4.8% historic minorities. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING
JUDICIAL DIVERSITY, ADVISORY PANEL ON JUDICIAL DIVERSITY 2010, U.K. 66 tbl.2 (2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/policy/moj/judicial-diversity-
report-201 0.pdf. Most of the non-traditional judges were concentrated at the lowest levels of the
court system. See infra note 213.
Focusing on the higher judiciary (again, constituting the High Court, the Court of Appeal,
and, as of October 2009, the U.K. Supreme Court in place of the Appellate Committee of the
House of Lords), the April 2009 report of the Judiciary of England and Wales shows that there
were no minority ethnic judges among the Law Lords or Court of Appeal justices and only three
minority ethnic judges among the eighty-five High Court judges participating in the survey. See
2009 Annual Ethnicity Statistics, JUDICIARY ENG. & WALES, http://www.judiciary.gov/uk
/publications-and-reports/statistics/divesrity-stats-and-gen-overview/annual-ethnicity-statistics
/annual-ethnicity-statistics-2009 (last visited Aug. 11, 2011). At the time, there were 159 judges
serving on the higher courts, 109 on the High Court, 38 on the Court of Appeal, and 12 on the
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. Id; see also PROFESSOR LIZZIE BARMES ET AL.,
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, EVIDENCE TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE
CONSTITUTION INQUIRY INTO THE JUDICIAL AMENDMENT PROCESS 2 (2011) [hereinafter EQUAL
JUSTICE INITIATIVE], available at http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/eji/docs/EJI%20submission
%201NQUIRY%201NTO%20THE%20JUDICIAL%20APPOINTMENTS%20PROCESS.pdf
(reporting that 12.8% of higher court judges are women; "In fact, the number of women in the
Court of Appeal is the same as it was ten years ago and their proportional representation has
decreased from 7.5% to 7%").
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court levels and largely unattributable to mandatory retirement.217
Diversification of the judiciary by sex, race, and ethnicity, to the extent it has
occurred, has been due to profound changes in the demographics of the legal
profession and to the use of positive, or affirmative, action by judicial
appointment officials, of which Malleson and others assert much more is
218
needed2. Still, in submitting written testimony to the House of Lords Select
Committee on the Constitution concerning judicial appointments reform in
June 2011, the Equal Justice Initiative, represented by six feminist law
professors from leading U.K. law schools, stated that the mandatory judicial
retirement age should not be raised from seventy, explaining, "Although
experienced judges have much to contribute, progress towards greater diversity
will be undermined if retirement ages are raised." 19
The House of Commons debate on the 1993 Act suggests that, in addition to
diversity concerns, the lowering of the mandatory retirement age was also
motivated by interest in making judicial retirement ages more uniform
throughout the United Kingdom, by concern for older judges' handling of
the criminal docket, particularly sentencing matters,221 and by interest in
redressing the public's perception of judges as out of touch with modem
realities. Conducted by the Law Society, the national solicitors' organization,
one survey revealed that sixty-five percent of the public subscribed to the
belief that "Judges are out of touch with everyday life and everyday people."222
Eighty-six percent of respondents to the survey thought "that judges should
retire earlier than the present judicial retirement age of 75," and a Mr. Boateng,
MP, asserted that "[t]he overwhelming conclusion about the composition of the
bench was that judges were too old, too male, too white, and too out of
touch." 223 Only once, however, was age-based mental decline articulated as a
217. See, e.g., CHERYL THOMAS, COMM'N FOR JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS, JUDICIAL
DIVERSITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS 104 (2005); see also 2009
Gender Statistics, JUDICIARY ENG. & WALES, http://www.juidiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-
reports/statistics/diversity-states-and-gen-overview/gender-statistics/gender-statistics-judges-in-
post-2009 (reflecting disproportionate number and percentage of women at the lowest court level,
including 49.65% of deputy masters, the lowest ranked members ofjudicial hierarchy).
218. See, e.g., Kate Malleson, Appointments to the House of Lords: Who Goes Upstairs, in
THE JUDICIAL HOUSE OF LORDS, 1876-2009, at 112, 121 (Louis Blom-Cooper et al. eds., 2009);
Kate Malleson, It's Time to Court Women, TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 31, 2011, at 69 (arguing for
greater consciousness on the part of judicial appointments commissions of the importance of
judicial diversity because women and racial and ethnic minorities will not simply "trickle up").
219. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 216, at 8. EJl describes itself as "committed to
working towards gender parity on the bench." Id at I n. 1.
220. 215 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1992) 425-87 (U.K.).
221. See id at 447.
222. 538 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) (1992) 725-65 (U.K.) ("The public perception of the
judiciary at times lapses into caricature. The picture is of a figure such as Mr. Justice
Cocklecarrot - elderly, wearing a wig and ermine, and as narrow-minded as he is short-sighted.").
223. Id.
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reason for lowering the mandatory retirement age.224 This is striking, given the
modestly prominent role that concern for potential mental decline played in
enactment of the 1959 Act.225
The then-Senior Law Lord, Lord Bingham, criticized the 1993 Act's
lowering of the judicial retirement age, calling it contrary to the Law Lords'
lived experience:
The reduction of the retirement age from 75 to 70 may in retrospect
be recognised as an error . . . . There has not in practice been a
problem of senile judges who should have retired and declined to do
so. And Law Lords, like the rest of the population, live (and, it is
226
hoped, retain their faculties) for longer.
In offering this critique, Bingham underscored that "the earlier retirement age
is not compensated by earlier appointment to less senior judicial office: the
,,2 2trend is, if anything, upwards. Bingham's statement implicitly referenced
the fact that, despite the absence of an official policy or practice of judicial
promotion, a judicial career ladder nevertheless exists in England and
Wales.228 Given the length of time it takes to move up the judicial career
229ladder, the reduction in mandatory retirement age limited the length of time
that a judge could serve on the higher or highest courts.230 To be sure,
promotion along the judicial career ladder is not required for appointment to
the higher courts, but it is common, as nearly every justice on the U.K.
Supreme Court today came up through the higher court ranks.231
Parliament continues to debate the merits of mandatory retirement at
seventy, particularly for U.K. Supreme Court Justices. In 2009, Lord Pannick,
a highly regarded peer on the House of Lords Constitutional Affairs
Committee, asked a government minister "whether [Her Majesty's
224. Id.
225. See supra text accompanying note 197.
226. Tom Bingham, The Law Lords: Who Has Served, in THE JUDICIAL HOUSE OF LORDS,
supra note 218, at 122, 125-26 ("The problem of giving recruits to the Supreme Court time to
develop and mature is exacerbated by the current retirement age of 70.").
227. Id at 126. Why judges are not being appointed at a younger age, given the twenty-year
service requirement for pension eligibility, is not known.
228. See, e.g., 25 Mar. 2009, PARL. DEB., H.L. (2009) 654 (U.K.) (arguing that the lower
retirement age wastes the talents of well-qualified judges because of the time it takes for them to
work their way up to the top); see also CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, THE POWER
OF JUDGES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY 43-48 (2002) (noting that a
judicial career ladder has grown over time in England and Wales such that "today some type of a
career pattern has taken shape . . . . Professional full-time judges tend to be chosen from among
the ranks of part-time judges").
229. GUARNIERI & PEDERZOLI, supra note 228, at 24 (noting that lengthy advocacy
qualifications result in older judges being appointed).
230. See MALLESON, supra note 209, at 104-05.
231. Biographies of the Justices, SUP. CT., http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/
biographies.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
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Government] will consider raising the retirement age for Supreme Court
justices to 75," and he was told that the Government was "keeping this issue
under review."232 Pannick continued:
I thank the Minister for that slightly encouraging response. When he
looks at this matter again, will he agree that special consideration
should apply to judges of the Supreme Court, in that they are the
cream of the judiciary and inevitably take time to rise to the top,
normally after serving for several years in the High Court and then in
the Court of Appeal? 3
Pannick concluded, "Is it not therefore a terrible waste of our most valuable
judicial resources to dispose of them after a short stay in the Supreme
Court?" 2 34 Reflecting some of the concerns animating England and Wales'
mandatory judicial retirement policy, the government minister responded, "We
have to try to strike a balance between retaining experience and ensuring the
flow of high quality applicants to the highest judicial office."235 Whether the
mandatory retirement age will be raised, particularly for the new U.K.
Supreme Court, is uncertain.
D. Convention Against Return to Practice for Higher Court Judges in England
and Wales
Despite mandatory retirement provisions, the prevailing convention in
England and Wales counsels against higher court judges returning to practice
following resignation or retirement.236 The convention against former judges'
return to practice has been articulated most recently, and officially, in the
Judges' Council's 237 Guide to Judicial Conduct2 38-a hortatory, rather than
mandatory, guide. 239 The relevant section states:
232. 25 Mar. 2009, PARL. DEB., H.L. (2009) 654 (U.K.).
233. Id
234. Id
235. Id
236. See JUDGES' COUNCIL, GUIDE TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT 1 9.1, at 48 (Supp. 2008)
[hereinafter GUIDE TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT].
237. The Judges' Council currently represents a broad array of English and Welsh judges,
though it had historically represented only the most senior judges. See Judges' Council,
JUDICIARY ENG. & WALES, www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-in-
detail/index/judges-council (last visited July 17, 2011).
238. The Judges' Council's Guide to Judicial Conduct was first published in 2004 and
amended in 2006 and 2008. GUIDE TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 236, at ii.
239. See Diana Woodhouse, Judicial Independence and Accountability within the United
Kingdom's New Constitutional Settlement, in INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE
JUDICIARY 121, 131 (Guy Canivet et al. eds., 2006) ("Unlike Codes of Conduct in other parts of
the public sector, there is no regulatory procedure through which individuals can be held to
account for breaching the rules [set forth in the Guide]. The status of the document as a Guide
prevents this.").
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The conditions of appointment to judicial office provide that judges
accept appointment on the understanding that following the
termination of their appointment they will not return to private
practice as a barrister or a solicitor and will not provide services, on
whatever basis, as an advocate in any court or tribunal in England
and Wales or elsewhere, including any international court or tribunal,
in return for remuneration of any kind, or offer or provide legal
advice to any person.240
Although the understanding is that a former judge will not serve as a barrister
or solicitor,241 "[a] former judge may provide services as an independent
arbitrator/mediator and may receive remuneration for lectures, talks or
articles."242 The Guide concludes by cautioning that "[e]ven in retirement a
former judge may still be regarded by the general public as a representative of
the judiciary and any activity that might tarnish the reputation of the judiciary
should be avoided."
Thus, the convention articulates a powerful norm against return to practice.
It is not clear, however, when the convention against former judges' return to
practice first developed. Writing in 1993, Stevens noted that the Advisory
Group on the Judiciary had observed that "[n]o member of the Higher
Judiciary ha[d] returned to the Bar after retirement for nearly three-hundred
years and they may no longer do so."244 Noting that "the assertion was
probably not good constitutional law," 245 Stevens flagged the return-to-practice
issue as "a largely unexplored" one 246 and observed, "It is now not uncommon
for appeal judges and some High Court judges to return to their chambers on
retirement. While they cannot appear in court or give opinions, they are
240. GUIDE TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 236, 9.1, at 48 (emphasis added).
241. The legal professions in England and Wales are divided between solicitors and
barristers. See BRIAN ABEL-SMITH & ROBERT STEVENS, IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE: SOCIETY AND
THE LEGAL SYSTEM 38 (1968). Traditionally, solicitors, whose primary responsibility is to
represent clients, had no rights to enter an appearance before the higher courts. RICHARD L.
ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 218 (1988) [hereinafter ABEL, LEGAL
PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES]; ABEL-SMITH & STEVENS, supra. Barristers, by contrast,
did not interact with clients, but instead argued cases in court. See ABEL-SMITH & STEVENS,
supra, at 123. This division of responsibility has lessened to a degree following the Courts and
Legal Services Act 1990. Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, c. 41, §§ 27-28 (Eng.). Solicitors
can now apply for rights of audience to appear and argue cases in the higher courts, and barristers
can interact with clients under certain circumstances. Id; see also RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH
LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE: THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM 64 (2003)
[hereinafter ABEL, LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE].
242. GUIDE TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 236, 19.1, at 48.
243. Id. 9.2, at 48.
244. STEVENS, supra note 196, at 136.
245. Id. at 136-37.
246. Id at 137 n.156.
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allowed to give affidavits on English law, and have an active arbitration
,,247practice.
Some commentators have suggested that the development of the convention
might have been motivated by concern for actual or perceived conflicts of
interest arising from former judges receiving judicial pensions while appearing
248
as advocates before the bench. Others pointed to the potential threat to
public confidence in the courts if former judges appear to have been "bought"
by private interests and the doubt that that might instill as to whether currently
serving judges were seeking to curry favor with prospective employers through
the judgments they rendered.24 9
The then-Master of the Rolls 250 offered another explanation for the
development of the convention, which is that a judge "ceases to be a barrister
or a solicitor" when named to a judgeship.251 As a result, "on retirement, he
lacks any qualification to practice" and cannot, as a practical matter, return as
either a barrister or solicitor. 252 A similarly pragmatic explanation for the
convention recognizes that because all higher court judges are granted a
knighthood upon appointment to the bench and a sizeable pension upon
retirement, "it was not considered 'good form' to return to practi[c]e."253
Rather, a knighthood was seen, "in part, as compensation for loss of higher
income as a lawyer." 254  One commentator notes that significant problems
247. Id.
248. STEVENS, supra note 194, at 87.
249. See, e.g., Gordon Borrie, Judicial Conflicts ofInterest in Britain, 18 AM. J. COMP. L.
697, 706 (1970) (recounting, "Reginald Paget Q.C. asked, 'Does the Prime Minister consider it
desirable for industry to run its eye down the High Court bench and decide whom it will buy?');
Frances Gibb, It's Just the Job for a Retired Judge: The Chance of a Lucrative Return to Private
Practice Would Be Allowed Under a Controversial Reform, TIMES (London), Sept. 13, 2006, at
II ("Lord Woolf, the former Lord Chief Justice, has already expressed strong opposition to
judges being allowed to return to the law. He argued that there was a danger that judges hearing
cases involving big City practices might be seen to be influenced by the prospect of a career move
at the end of their time on the bench.").
250. The Master of the Rolls is "Head of Civil Justice, and the second most senior judicial
post in England and Wales, after the Lord Chief Justice." Biographies, JUDICIARY ENG. &
WALES, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/judges-magistrates-and-tribunal-judges/
biographies (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
251. TOM BINGHAM, Judicial Ethics, in THE BUSINESS OF JUDGING: SELECTED SPEECHES
AND ESSAYS 69, 84 (2000).
252. Thomas Bingham, Judicial Ethics, in LEGAL ETHICS AND RESPONSIBILITY 35, 50-51
(R. Cranston ed., 1995).
253. E-mail from Alexander Home, Human Rights, Public Law, and Terrorism Specialist,
Home Affairs Research Section, House of Commons, Dep't of Info. Servs., to Author (Feb. 24,
2011, 7:21 AM) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-mail from Alexander Home]; see also Gibb,
supra note 249, at II ("[S]ome judges argue that lawyers should not be allowed to take the
privilege of a knighthood and then return to practice.").
254. E-mail from Alexander Home, supra note 253.
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could arise for the retention of judges if higher court judges were able to retain
their knighthood honors after leaving the bench to return to private practice. 255
The convention against former judges' return to practice has been enforced
by informal norms and understandings. For example, in 1970, Mr. Justice
Fisher was roundly criticized for resigning from the High Court bench to
pursue business opportunities (and not law practice) in London.2 56  Lord
Chancellor Hailsham became involved, chastising Fisher that High Court
judges should approach the bench as if the priesthood, with a lifetime
257
commitment and single-minded devotion.
According to interviews with legal practitioners and academics for this
project, former judges are increasingly doing "end-runs" on the return-to-
practice convention, with growing numbers of former judges choosing to
serve as legal consultants to barristers' chambers or solicitors' firms.25 For
example, Mr. Justice Laddie attracted attention when he left the bench to serve
as a legal consultant to a solicitors' firm, declaring, "From the isolation of the
Bench, I will be returned to the fun and mutual support of working in a
team."260 Notably, the former Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, in
championing the government's effort to end the return-to-practice convention,
assured relevant audiences that the government's new policy would not apply
to him, declaring it inappropriate for the former official charged with judicial
appointments to appear as an advocate before judges.261  Nevertheless,
Falconer recently joined the London office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, a
U.S.-based law firm, as a legal consultant. 262
Mr. Justice Smith's effort to secure post-bench employment with a London
solicitors' firm is yet another example of a recent breach of the convention
against return to practice. 263 The Court of Appeal and the Lord Chief Justice
255. Id.
256. STEVENS, supra note 194, at 87.
257. 312 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1970) (U.K.).
258. See notes on interviews with legal practitioners and academics for this project (on file
with author).
259. See, e.g., Frances Gibb, Lord Chancellor to Review Ban on Judges Returning to
Practise Law, TIMES (London), June 23, 2005, at 26 (discussing how several judges plan to join
solicitors' firms as consultants).
260. Joshua Rozenburg, 'Bored' High Court Judge Resigns, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
June 22, 2005, at 1; Clare Dyer, Boredom Forces Judge to Quit, GUARDIAN, June 23, 2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,, I513546,00.html.
261. See Gibb, supra note 249, at II ("Lord Falconer added: 'In case there is any doubt, I am
not thinking of myself. I have already said I won't return to practice if there is ever a day when I
am no longer Lord Chancellor."'); see also Frances Gibb, Straw Won't Allow Judges to Return to
the Bar, TIMES (London), Nov. 6, 2007, at 28.
262. See Press Release, Gibson Dunn, Former Lord Chancellor Lord Falconer Joins Gibson
Dunn's London Office (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/news/Pages/
FormerLordChancellorLordFalconer.aspx.
263. See Frances Gibb, 'Da Vinci Code' Judge Escapes with Reprimand, TIMES ONLINE
(London) (Apr. 18, 2008), http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article 3 7 7 4 109.ece.
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reprimanded Mr. Justice Smith for failing to recuse himself when the
solicitors' firm with which he had spoken about post-bench employment
appeared before him after his employment negotiations with them had broken
down.264 However, Smith was not reprimanded for engaging in post-bench
employment inquiries with the firm; rather, the reprimand came in response to
his "wholly inappropriate" exchanges in court after being asked to step
265down. Smith's treatment stands in contrast with the early 1970s plight of
Mr. Justice Fisher,266 suggesting greater tolerance of post-bench employment
by judges today.
Arguably building on this changed sentiment, in late 2005, the British
government-under then-Lord Chancellor Lord Falconer-announced its
267intention to remove the prohibition against former judges' return to practice.
Despite its intention, the government lacked authority to effect this change,
given the then-recent concordat entered into by the Lord Chancellor and Lord
Chief Justice, which transferred most judicial governance matters to the Lord
268Chief Justice. Moreover, the government mischaracterized the convention
in referring to it as a "prohibition" that the government intended to
"remove."2 Nowhere is there evidence that the convention had ever been
formally enacted as an enforceable prohibition.270  Rather, it has been
consistently referred to as a "convention" or an "understanding."
264. Id.
265. See id. (discussing how the judge was "castigated" after failing to recuse himself and for
displaying "undoubted animosity" toward one of the partners).
266. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
267. DEP'T OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, RETURN TO PRACTICE BY FORMER SALARIED
JUDGES 6-7 (2006) [hereinafter FORMER SALARIED JUDGES], available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/cpl506.pdf. The government had earlier explored
this issue in its 2004-05 consultation paper, Increasing Diversity in the Judiciary. DEP'T OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, INCREASING DIVERSITY IN THE JUDICIARY, RESPONSES TO DCA
CONSULTATION PAPER CP 25/04 at 8, 62-65, 76-77 (2005), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/judiciary/diversitycp
25-04.htm. In its Summary of Responses to the Consultation Paper, the government noted that
the majority view was that "the policy on preclusion of return to practice ... is, perhaps, an
outdated policy and consideration should be given as to whether it should be relaxed." Id
The Blair government's proposal to "remove the prohibition" was proximate in time to other
government-sponsored judicial reforms, most importantly, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005,
establishing a free-standing U.K. Supreme Court independent of the House of Lords for the first
time. See Constitutional Reform Act 2005, 2005, c.4 (Eng.). In 2004, the Lord Chancellor and
Lord Chief Justice entered into a concordat, agreeing on the transfer of much of the
responsibilities for judicial governance to the judiciary. DEP'T OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS,
THE LORD CHANCELLOR'S JUDICIARY-RELATED FUNCTIONS: PROPOSALS (2004), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/=/http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/Icoffice//judiciary.ht
m#part2.
268. Id.
269. See FORMER SALARIED JUDGES, supra note 267, at 3.
270. See id.
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The Judges' Council, representing the judiciary of England and Wales,
balked at the government's announcement of its intended change, failure to
consult, lack of authority to effect the change, and mischaracterization of the
convention as a prohibition. 271 Nevertheless, the government persisted with its
plan to reverse accepted practice, publishing a consultation paper272 entitled,
"Return to Practice by Former Salaried Judges." 273 This consultation paper
sought feedback on only the question of what safeguards the government
should implement when effectuating its plan to "remove the current
prohibition on all holders of salaried judicial office returning to legal practice
on ceasing to hold judicial office. 274
The government asserted diversity as its primary motivation for its proposed
policy, explaining that "[tihe current prohibition can act as a deterrent to
applicants from groups under-represented in the judiciary concerned that they
will be unable to pro ress through the judicial ranks and have no route back
into legal practice." Although noting evidence existed to support the
assertion that ending the convention would diversify the judiciary, the
government did not cite any data to support this assertion. 277 Indeed, support
271. See JUDGES' COUNCIL, RESPONSE OF THE JUDGES' COUNCIL TO THE DCA
CONSULTATION PAPER "RETURN TO PRACTICE BY FORMER SALARIED JUDGES" (Dec. 21, 2006)
[hereinafter JUDGES' COUNCIL RESPONSE], available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/
NR/rdonlyres/FC640846-B950-4807-A517-6AD3OB6DECA6/0/practice response 211206.pdf.
The judges' objections relied in substantial part on the 2004 concordat. See, e.g., James Harrison,
Judging the Judges: The New Scheme of Judicial Conduct and Discipline in Scotland, 13
EDINBURGH L. REV. 427, 427, 433 (2009).
272. The British government regularly uses consultation papers such as this to solicit
feedback from the public and other interested parties on proposed legislation. See BETTER
REGULATION EXEC., DEP'T FOR Bus., ENTER. & REGULATORY REFORM, CODE OF PRACTICE ON
CONSULTATION 7 (2007).
273. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 15/06: RETURN TO
PRACTICE BY FORMER SALARIED JUDGES 6-7 (2006) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT CONSULTATION
PAPER], available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/cpl506.pdf; see also Gibb,
supra note 249, at 11. The reference to "salaried" judges in the title is to distinguish typically
full-time, salaried judges from typically part-time, "fee paid" judges. See Becoming a Judge:
Qualifications, JUDICIARY ENG. & WALES, http://wwwjudiciary.gov.uk/about-the-
judiciary/judges-magistrates-and-tribunal-judges/judges-career-paths/becoming-a-
judge#headingAnchor3 (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
274. GOVERNMENT CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 273, at 3.
275. Id; see also Gibb, supra note 249, at II ("The plans are aimed at encouraging a greater
diversity of people, including young people, women and ethnic minorities, to apply to be judges,
Lord Falconer of Thoroton, the Lord Chancellor, said."); Gibb, supra note 249, at 26 (reporting
on Lord Falconer's address to the Commission for Judicial Appointments, which highlighted the
pro-diversity implications of the government's proposed reform).
276. GOVERNMENT CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 273, at 6.
277. The government did, however, reference a report commissioned by the Department of
Constitutional Affairs, seeking to ascertain the causes of underrepresentation of certain groups in
the judiciary by conducting interviews and discussion groups with current barristers, solicitors,
and judges. Id. (citing OPINION LEADER RESEARCH, JUDICIAL DIVERSITY: FINDINGS OF A
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for this proposition could have been found in academic literature, most
prominently in the work of Professor Kate Malleson. 278
The government's consultation paper briefly acknowledged arguments
against the proposed policy change, including concern for (1) actual or
apparent undue influence exerted by former judges returning to the bar as
advocates, and (2) currently serving judges currying favor with parties and
others to promote their post-bench employment prospects.279 The government
responded to these concerns by underscoring the importance of the judiciary's
integrity and impartiality and noting the availability of safeguards to minimize
apparent or actual conflicts, including its proposed two-year "cooling off'
period between retirement and return to practice.
The Judges' Council opposed the government's plan to "remove the
prohibition." 281  Its Chair, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales,
reiterated the Council's earlier position that the government lacked the power
to make this type of change following the concordat; rather, the Lord Chief
,,282Justice declared that the decision is a "matter for the judiciary. The
Judges' Council also asserted that there was no evidence that lifting the bar on
return to practice would increase judicial diversity, the proposed safeguards
283
were unworkable, and the government's proposal would wreak "serious
impact[s] on the standing and status of the judiciary." 284 On this last point, the
Lord Chief Justice warned that lifting the bar "would further open serving
judges to accusations of bias and would be detrimental to the public's current
perception of the judiciary as independent and impartial."285
CONSULTATION WITH BARRISTERS, SOLICITORS, AND JUDGES: FINAL REPORT 3 (Jan. 2006),
available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/publications/reports-reviews/jd cbsj06.pdf)).
278. See, e.g., Kate Malleson, Selecting Judges in the Era of Devolution and Human Rights,
in BUILDING THE U.K.'s NEW SUPREME COURT: NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
306 (Andrew Le Sueur ed., 2004).
279. GOVERNMENT CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 273, at 7.
280. Id. at 7-8; cf infra note 420 and accompanying text (noting that a cooling-off period
could be considered if a prohibition on return to practice is adopted for Article III judiciary).
281. See JUDGES' COUNCIL RESPONSE, supra note 271, at 1-2 (offering the Judges' Council
official opposition to lifting the ban in a short statement signed by the chairman); JUDGES'
COUNCIL WORKING PARTY, RESPONSE OF THE JUDGES' COUNCIL TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
LORD FALCONER OF THORNTON, JUDICIAL DIVERSITY: RETURN TO THE PRACTICE BY FORMER
JUDGES 3 (2006), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/0FlA673C-734E-
473E-B4CC-CA3FD66E6AAF/0/reportjudges wg lcjjanO6.pdf.
282. See JUDGES' COUNCIL RESPONSE, supra note 271, at 2.
283. The Judges' Council asserted that the proposed safeguards were unworkable in part
because they were premised on the requirement that judges serve for a minimum of five years
before being eligible to return to practice under the new policy. JUDGES' COUNCIL WORKING
GROUP, REPORT OF THE JUDGES' COUNCIL WORKING GROUP ON THE CONSULTATION PAPER
CP15/06, at 11-12 (2006), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/8E6D0ACC-
E107-45C7-A517-CB416E4DD204/0/workingpartyreportjc_301106.pdf
284. JUDGES' COUNCIL RESPONSE, supra note 271, at 1-2.
285. Id at 1.
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The Bar Council, representing the barristers, also opposed the government's
plan. Noting that the "principal justification for the convention is to maintain
the dignity and authority" of judicial office, the Bar Council warned "that
commercial law firms in the City of London . . . will be very keen to recruit
former Judges and use their recruitment for marketing purposes, here and
abroad. We consider that this will detract from the dignity of the Bench and
the respect in which it is held."286 Citing the government's own research, the
Bar Council emphasized "that the prohibition on return to practice is not a
significant barrier [to judicial service] for most people because they see
judicial appointment as coming at the end of their careers."287 The Bar
Council further cited the government's research, revealing that "most people
would not want to return to practice even if they were allowed to do so," and
concluded that the government's proposed change would not bring a positive
impact on diversity.
Lastly, the London Solicitors' Litigation Association (LSLA) opposed the
government's proposal, underscoring its members' concerns that removing the
convention would undermine the public's perception of judicial impartiality
289
and risk harm to London's standing as the international forum of choice.
Thereafter, LSLA referenced recent experiences of other similarly situated
common law countries (specifically the former commonwealth jurisdictions of
Ireland and South Africa) that had ended their conventions against return to
practice and not seen any impact on judicial diversity. 290  In the face of
overwhelming opposition, however, particularly from the judiciary, the
government abandoned its plan to end the convention against return to
-291practice.
286. THE BAR COUNCIL, RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION PAPER: RETURN TO PRACTICE BY
FORMER SALARIED JUDGES 3 (2006) [hereinafter BAR COUNCIL RESPONSE], available at
http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/consultations/pastresponsestoextemalconsultations/ReponsesToCo
nsultationPapers2006/ ("The ethos of the Bench depends, to a large extent, on its permanent
severance from the practising profession, and will be likely to be harmed if Judges return in any
number to practice as lawyers. Movement backwards and forwards between Bar and Bench (or
between the Bench and the solicitors profession) would tend to lower the public estimation of the
judiciary.").
287. Id (citing OPINION LEADER RESEARCH, supra note 277, at 39).
288. Id (citing OPINION LEADER RESEARCH, supra note 277, at 67).
289. LONDON SOLICITORS LITIGATIONS ASSOCIATION, LSLA RESPONSE TO DCA
CONSULTATION PAPER CP 15/06 "RETURN TO PRACTICE BY FORMER SALARIED
JUDGES" 2 (2006), available at http://www.1sla.co.uk/ data/assets/pdffile/0019/41356/
RetumtoPrivatePractice-FinalLSLAresponse.pdf.
290. Id at 3. Whether or not this is an accurate representation of the effect of lifting other
countries' conventions is not known.
291. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RETURN TO PRACTICE BY FORMER SALARIED JUDGES:
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES 18 (May 11, 2007); Gibb, supra note 265, at 28 (reporting that the
Government had "ditched controversial reforms that would have allowed judges, including
former Lord Chancellors, to go back to work as lawyers after a stint on the bench.").
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E. Comparative Conclusions
Having looked to English and Welsh experience to learn more about other
approaches to judicial tenure and return-to-practice questions and what reforms
the United States might consider for its Article III judiciary, it is apparent that
not only were there the usual concerns about the applicability of other legal
and judicial systems' rules and practices, 292 but that most of the rationales for
adopting mandatory retirement in England and Wales were quite different from
those that have been offered in support of mandatory retirement or fixed-term
service reforms for the Article III bench.293
As discussed, the initial introduction of mandatory retirement in England
and Wales was motivated by concern that the judiciary was out of touch with
modem realities, vulnerable to mental failings, and needed to be "more
relevant and less formalistic." 294 The subsequent lowering of the mandatory
retirement age was explained, in large part, by interest in creating judicial
vacancies for women and racial and ethnic minorities to fill,295 although
concern was again expressed for the judiciary being out of touch, for its
questionable handling of criminal cases, and, briefly, for the potential for
mental failing (though Lord Bingham was later adamant that senile judges
refusing to step down had not been a problem in England and Wales).296
The mental acuity rationale for mandatory retirement, although one of
297
several factors in England and Wales (and a more minor factor at that),
constitutes the central rationale offered for mandatory retirement reform and
one of three key rationales cited in support of introducing fixed-service terms
for U.S. Supreme Court Justices.29 Concern for "mental decrepitude"
therefore motivates U.S. scholars' proposals to reform life tenure to a far
greater degree than has been true of the mandatory retirement reform proposals
in England and Wales.
292. With the legal and judicial (as well as political, cultural, etc.) differences in mind, this
comparison is not intended to suggest a legal import or transplant from England and Wales to the
United States, or vice versa, but is rather an invitation to further reflection and understanding.
See generally Vicki Jackson, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 8-15
(2010); Sujit Choudhry, Migration As a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS I (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); Tom Ginsburg,
Lawrence M. Friedman 's Comparative Law, in LAW, SOCIETY, AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON
THEMES IN THE LEGAL SOCIOLOGY AND LEGAL HISTORY OF LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN (Robert
W. Gordon & Morton J. Horwitz eds., 2011); Mark Tushnet, Some Reflections on Method in
Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, supra, at 67.
293. Compare Part I, with Part II.C-D.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 202-07.
295. See supra text accompanying note 213.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 221-22, 226.
297. See supra text accompanying note 318.
298. See supra Part I.D.
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Next, the English and Welsh concern for judges being out of touch with
modem realities and needing to be "more relevant" (and "less formalistic") 299
resonates with one of the principal concerns animating fixed-term proposals in
the United States, albeit in a limited way. Calabresi and Lindgren and
Carrington and Cramton argue that term limits are preferable to life tenure, in
part, because they render judges more democratically accountable to the
public, where these authors understand judges to be increasingly out of touch
with the will of the people.300 Although the U.S. and English and Welsh
concerns for judges being "out of touch" resonate to a degree, the resonance
ends when looking at the purposes to which the arguments are put-for an
understanding of the Constitution consistent with its text and history as
embraced by the American public, which underlies the U.S. term-limit
proposals,301 and for a progressive understanding of the law's role in
addressing social problems, in the view of Lord Kilmuir and more
302
contemporary English and Welsh reformers. Thus, while Kilmuir sought to
increase the courts' capacity to address current issues through the adoption of a
mandatory retirement rule, Calabresi and Lindgren and Carrington and
Cramton seek to constrain the U.S. Supreme Court's power by making it more
publicly accountable through more frequent appointments that are more
reflective of prevailing public opinion.
Finally, the U.S. mandatory-retirement and term-limit proposals have been
offered entirely without reference to potential impacts on judicial diversity in
stark contrast with the mandatory retirement reforms in England and Wales.
None of the leading mandatory retirement proposals (Garrow, Ward, and, to a
lesser extent, Epstein) or term-limit proposals (Calabresi and Lindgren,
Carrington and Cramton, Oliver, and Powe) assert diversity by sex, race, or
ethnicity as a basis for reforming life tenure. 303
Given these important differences, the English and Welsh experience with
mandatory retirement may have limited relevance in the context of life-tenure
reform for Article III judges. However, the same is not true for the
return-to-practice question. Rather, the United States should look to the
English and Welsh experience with a convention against return to practice in
thinking about its desirability for the Article III judiciary because many of the
same concerns apply, specifically the concern for the effects of actual and
apparent conflicts of interest on judicial independence, impartiality, and
integrity.
299. See supra text accompanying note 205.
300. See Calabresi & Lindgren, original version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra
note 9, at 58-59 (celebrating popular understandings of the Constitution grounded in fidelity to
text and history); Carrington & Cramton, online version of The Supreme Court Renewal Act,
supra note 9; supra text accompanying notes 22-23, 45-46.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 202-06.
303. See supra Part I (containing no discussion ofjudicial diversity).
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Still, two pragmatic factors contributed to the development of the return-to-
practice convention in England and Wales that have no applicability in the
United States. First, concern for the "bad form" of a higher court judge
retaining his knighthood while returning to practice304 has no parallel in the
United States. Second, judges cease being barristers or solicitors upon
appointment, 305 which likewise has no parallel in the United States. In
addition to these pragmatic differences, the British government's 2005-2006
proposal to end the convention was motivated by interest in diversifying the
judiciary by sex, race, and ethnicity,306 which has not figured in the Article III
return-to-practice discussion, though, as noted before, there has hardly been a
discussion. This lack of discussion should change and when it does, possible
effects of a return-to-practice prohibition on judicial diversity should be
addressed.
As for implementing a return-to-practice prohibition, the circumstances in
the United States are significantly different from those in England and Wales.
Not only are there distinct differences in the structure and character of the U.S.
and English and Welsh legal professions and judiciaries, but, as the British
Government's 2005-2006 effort to end the convention revealed, there was a
striking unanimity of opposition to the proposal on the part of organized
judges, barristers, and London-based solicitors (though not other solicitors).307
There has not been a similar unanimity of opposition to judges returning to
practice in the United States. Quite to the contrary, the Code of Conduct for
U.S. Judges, published by the Judicial Conference of the United States (JCUS),
makes clear that return to practice is a matter for the states, and not the federal
judiciary, to regulate because it involves a former judge's work as a lawyer.308
This contrasts with the English and Welsh Judges' Council's Guide to Judicial
Behavior, which addressed the return-to-practice question in providing
guidance to currently serving judges. 309 Organized judges and lawyers in the
states, as reflected in state legal ethics codes, have not supported prohibiting
former judges from returning to practice; rather, both the JCUS and the states
have offered guidance on how a judge may pursue the return to practice. 310
Despite skepticism for the likelihood of its adoption in the United States, I
commend consideration of the English and Welsh convention against return to
practice for the Article III judiciary out of concern for effects on judicial
independence, impartiality, and integrity.311
304. See supra text accompanying notes 253-55.
305. See supra text accompanying note 240.
306. See supra notes 266-76 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 281-90 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 184-85.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 279, 284-85, 288.
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III. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RETAIN LIFE TENURE WITHOUT
MANDATORY RETIREMENT OR FIXED-SERVICE TERMS AND PROHIBIT ARTICLE
III JUDGES FROM RETURNING TO PRACTICE
This Article recommends retention of life tenure for all Article III judges,
rejecting recent proposals for fixed terms of service and mandatory retirement
for Supreme Court Justices.312 This recommendation is principally informed
by concern for the negative effects that altering Article III tenure could have on
313judicial independence.31 The Article does, however, propose several reforms
to respond to concern for judges "staying on the bench too long,"-that is,
staying beyond their physical or mental ability to perform the work
appropriately.
The Article also recommends prohibiting Article III judges from returning to
law practice or legal consulting after serving on the bench. This
recommendation is informed by concern for the actual and apparent effects on
judicial independence, impartiality, and integrity of former judges pursuing
and engaging in post-bench legal employment. This recommendation is also
shaped by insights gained from the English and Welsh experience, 314 which
suggests the importance of extending the prohibition to work as a legal
consultant as well as lawyer, where both present concerns for potential judicial
conflicts of interest.
A. Retaining Life Tenure Without Mandatory Retirement or Fixed Terms of
Service for Article III Judges
Among the most important rationales offered by the Founders for Article III
tenure during good behavior was the importance of ensuring security of tenure
to: (1) safeguard judicial independence, thought essential to the effective
functioning of the checks and balances of separated powers; (2) recruit and
retain the best legal minds for the Article III bench;3 16 and (3) Frovide
economic security to Article III judges in the absence of a pension. Only
this third rationale has diminished as an argument for retaining life tenure,3 as
judicial pensions were introduced in 1869 and thereafter have been
periodically expanded in scope and terms of access.319
312. See supra Part I.
313. See supra Part I.
314. See supra Part II.D.
315. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 109, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton).
316. See id; THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 109, at 474-75 (Alexander Hamilton).
317. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 109, at 473 (Alexander Hamilton).
318. Jackson, supra note 9, at 1002 ("Some reasons given at the time for providing life
tenure, including the need to avoid judges' worrying about earning a living after their service,
have been basically mooted by the provision of pensions for Article III judges." (footnote
omitted)).
319. See supra notes 127-42 and accompanying text.
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The first and second rationales for life tenure continue to be important today.
First, life tenure without mandatory retirement or term limits continues to
promote the institutional and individual independence of Article III judges. It
promotes institutional independence because a high degree of security of
tenure promotes the judiciary's autonomy to review and interpret the law,
critical to the effective operation of checks and balances against the legislative
and executive branches.320  It promotes individual independence because
judges are empowered to decide cases as they see fit, free from concern for
securing post-bench employment and the effects that could have on the actual
or perceived independence, impartiality, and integrity of their judgments.321 In
fixed-term or mandatory-retirement schemes, the potential for negative impacts
of judges' post-bench employment inquiries on their decisional independence
is acute because judges in these situations may be compelled to leave the bench
long before they are ready to forego gainful employment.322 However, this
potential negative impact cannot be eliminated through tenure security alone;
for that, a prohibition on former judges' return to practice is also required.323
Calabresi and Lindgren sought to respond to the judicial-independence
concern by asserting that "[t]he eighteen-year nonrenewable term [that they]
propose is more than long enough to guarantee judicial independence without
producing the pathologies associated with the current system of life tenure." 324
Calabresi and Lindgren also note that their proposal contemplates paying
Supreme Court Justices for life, well after their high court service expires,
thereby ostensibly preempting any need for judges to consider post-bench
employment. Their idea of paying term-expired Supreme Court Justices for
life, however, is premised on the former Justices serving as district court or
court of appeals judges,326 which, as noted earlier, may be a hard sell,
particularly if they had served as district court or court of appeals judges before
320. See, e.g., Burbank et al., Reconsidering Judicial Independence, supra note 30, at 9-10;
Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence, in INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, supra note 30, at 160, 162-63.
321. Cf Farnsworth, supra note 16, at 251-52 (emphasizing the importance of Supreme
Court Justices' life tenure as protection against removal from office on grounds of public
opposition to their rulings).
322. Id at 263-64 (underscoring danger of retiring justices under age- or term-limited
systems angling for remunerative opportunities in private practice). But see Lee Epstein et al.,
Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 7, 33 (2001) ("[A] set,
non-renewable term may actually promote and sustain judicial independence in the long run-by
preserving the legitimacy of the high court as an independent branch of government.").
323. See supra notes 283, 288-89 and accompanying text.
324. Calabresi & Lindgren, second version of Term Limits for the Supreme Court, supra note
9, at 775.
325. Id at 775.
326. Id at 856.
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being elevated to the high court, which is increasingly likely given recent
promotion patterns in the Article III judiciary.32 7
Second, tenure in good behavior without mandatory retirement or
non-renewable terms continues to promote the government's ability to recruit
328
and retain excellent judges through its guarantee of job security. By
contrast, mandatory retirement or non-renewable terms might deter the best
and the brightest from joining the judiciary, as udges and other commentators
feared would happen in England and Wales.32 Moreover, anything short of
life tenure would deprive litigants and the public of Article III judges'
accumulated expertise, knowledge, wisdom, and skill, as such alternatives
would compel judges to leave the bench before they would voluntarily choose
to do so.
This Article advocates the retention of life tenure without mandatory
retirement or term limits, even though most other Western democratic states
have moved to mandatory retirement or fixed-service terms for their high court
judges.330 For example, Australia and Israel mandate judicial retirement at-age
seventy. 33  Canada mandates judicial retirement at age seventy-five, and
France and Germany have non-renewable nine- and twelve-year terms for their
332
constitutional court justices. According to Professor Lee Epstein and her
coauthors, the leading rationales for adopting term limits in many of these
countries is preserving bench quality and promoting judicial independence. 333
Even within the United States, more than three-quarters of U.S. states mandate
judicial retirement, typically at age seventy, although one state, Vermont,
mandates judicial retirement at age ninety. 4 Despite its now exceptional
327. See, e.g., Terri Peretti, Where Have All the Politicians Gone? Recruiting for the Modern
Supreme Court, 91 JUDICATURE 112 (2007).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
329. 215 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1992) 425-87 (U.K.). (noting that opponents' concern
that mandatory retirement at age seventy "was contrary to the public interest because it would
discourage those best qualified to accept judicial office"); see also MALLESON, supra note 213, at
104-05 (noting that the 1993 reduction in mandatory retirement age and increase in the pension
service requirement led some judges to fear that compelling barristers to give up their careers at
age fifty, "just when their earning power was starting to reach its peak," would "deter[] high
calibre candidates from considering a move to the bench" (citing Lord Ackner)).
330. See Epstein et al., supra note 326, at 23-27 (examining judicial tenure practices of
twenty-seven European countries and finding mandatory retirement or nonrenewable terms-or
some combination of the two-to be the dominant practice); Jackson, supra note 9, at 1002
("Most other western democracies, including those whose high courts are regarded as
independent and of high quality, provide for single nonrenewable terms, mandatory retirement
ages, or both."); Resnik, supra note 9, at 584 & n.3 ("Most countries provide mandatory ages for
retirement or for fixed, non-renewable terms of office.").
331. Resnik, supra note 9, at 615 & n.106.
332. Id at615&nn.108-09.
333. Epstein et al., supra note 326, at 23, 35-36.
334. See, e.g., JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 16.07 (4th ed.
2007) ("Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have laws mandating the retirement of
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nature, life tenure should be retained for the Article III judiciary because it has
worked reasonably well for more than 220 years. Absent compelling
reasons to change and evidence that the alternative to life tenure (whether fixed
terms or mandatory retirement) is an improvement that does not risk
336
unforeseen negative consequences, Article III tenure should be retained,
although several modifications should be introduced to encourage more and
earlier voluntary retirements and to provide for Supreme Court monitoring of
Justices' misconduct or disability.
To better address concerns for3judges staying on the bench too long and
developing mental "decrepitude," 3  this Article supports Stras and Scott's and
Resnik's advocacy of expanded pension benefits to encourage voluntary
retirement by judges before ill health affects their judicial service (Stras and
Scott's so-called incentives approach).338  Although Stras and Scott (but not
Resnik) focus exclusively on the Supreme Court, this Article looks to the entire
Article III judiciary to implement its reform recommendation, where the more
than 830 lower Article Ill judges vastly outnumber the nine Justices.339
Second, this Article recommends extending Stras and Scott's proposal for
improvin the retirement status (beyond pension benefits) of Supreme Court
Justices3 % to all Article III judges. Third, it advocates that the Supreme Court
adopt a formal, workable system for regulating misconduct and debilitating
judges when they reach a certain age. Two additional states, California and Maine, do not require
retirement of judges, but strongly encourage it by reducing or forfeiting a judge's retirement
benefits if the judge does not retire by a certain age. The high majority of judicial mandatory
retirement provisions set 70 as the age of mandatory retirement, but some provisions set the
retirement age of 72 or 75." (footnotes omitted)). See generally BERNARD S. MEYER, JUDICIAL
RETIREMENT LAWS OF THE FIFTY STATES AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1999) (comparing
the judicial retirement laws of the fifty states and the District of Columbia). Missouri's
mandatory judicial retirement rule was upheld in Gregory v. Ashcroft, which concluded that
Missouri had a rational basis for using age seventy as the cut-off to redress the "threat of
deterioration" amongjudges. 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991).
335. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
336. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 9, at 1002 ("[I]f we were starting from scratch in
designing an independent judiciary, there would be a range of alternatives to life tenure, some
perhaps superior, to consider. But we in the United States have an ongoing working system; we
are not starting from scratch; making changes could have unforeseen effects, including a sense of
diminished independence born from the direction of the proposed change.").
337. Id at 993 ("[L]ife tenure carries with it foreseeable risks of 'disability' and
'decrepitude,' of judges remaining in office (some for financial reasons) beyond the time when
they are at their best." (footnote omitted)).
338. Resnik, supra note 9, at 641; Stras & Scott, supra note 15, at 1439, 1445-66.
339. Mazza also targets his reform proposals at the lower Article Ill courts, calling for a
statutory limit on number of years served on the court of appeals before "the judge would rotate
to a position at the district level." Mazza, supra note 9, at 133, 155-62.
340. Stras & Scott, supra note 15, at 1455, 1465-66.
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disability among its members; the 1980 Act works "reasonably well" for lower
federal court judges, but is not applicable to the Supreme Court.341
First, pension benefits for all Article III judges, not just Supreme Court
Justices, should be expanded to encourage more, earlier retirements, again,
before ill health negatively affects judicial service.342  Specifically, regular
pension increases should be provided to all retired Article III judges who have
satisfied the Rule of 80, and not just to those retiring on senior status who
continue to hear cases, as is done now. Resnik has advocated using pension
benefits and penalties to create incentives for judges to step aside after a
number of years.343 Resnik suggested offering generous pension benefits to
judges serving no longer than fifteen years as a way to encourage more earlier
retirements. Like Resnik, Stras and Scott advocate altering judicial-pension
rules to encourage more earlier retirements, albeit just at the Supreme Court
level.345 Building on the work of Yoon and others in recognizing that pension
eligibility is the most important predictor of judicial retirement for lower court
judges (followed by the health of the judge),346 Stras and Scott propose
increases in pension benefits to as much as double a Justice's salary. 3 This
Article concurs with the idea informing Stras and Scott's proposal, but
recommends a different approach, extending regular salary increases to all
retired Article III judges who have satisfied the Rule of 80 or have certified a
disability to encourage more earlier retirements by lower federal court judges
and not just Supreme Court Justices.
Second, this Article supports Stras and Scott's recommendation to improve
justices' post-retirement status (beyond generous pension benefits) by
providing retired justices with enhanced opportunities to contribute to federal
court administration,348 which is also intended to encourage more voluntary
341. See Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2006)); see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
342. Cf Choi et al., supra note 54, at 15, 19, 22 (finding that pension eligibility triggers
district court judges to take senior status but not full retirement, and finding wealthy district court
judges less responsive to pension incentives); Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges
and the Political Economy of Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495, 499 (2005)
("The main finding of the article is that most federal judges step down from active status shortly
after qualifying for their pension, but choose to remain on the bench as senior judges."); Yoon,
supra note 54, at 145, 161-62, 172 (finding pension eligibility to be the strongest predictor of
judicial retirement for lower Article Ill judges, though not Supreme Court Justices).
343. Resnik, supra note 9, at 641.
344. Id.
345. Stras & Scott, supra note 15, at 1455.
346. Id. at 1400-01, 1433, 1447-49; accord Ross M. Stolzenberg & James Lindgren,
Retirement and Death in Office of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 269, 291
(2010) (finding that although political considerations play a role, pension eligibility has "a huge
effect" on retirement decisions of Supreme Court Justices).
347. Stras & Scott, supra note 15, at 1455; accord David R. Stras, The Incentives Approach
to Judicial Retirement, 90 MtNN. L. REV. 1417, 1439 (2006).
348. Stras & Scott, supra note 15, at 1465-66.
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retirement. Like pension reform, this Article advocates extending retirement
status improvements to all retired Article III judges, not just to Supreme Court
Justices. Former judges could assist with judicial administration projects, such
as service on special commissions to improve civics education or improve
judicial pay. Former judges might contribute most effectively in settings such
as the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the Federal Judicial Center,
and the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Although one critique of this
recommendation could be that it sounds like make-work, the idea is to provide
engaging, publicly spirited work as an attractive alternative to continuing to
hear cases so that judges do not stay on the bench too long. Work on judicial
administration projects would enable retired judges to continue to use their
accumulated expertise in a publicly recognized way.
Third, the Supreme Court should adopt a formal mechanism for addressing
potential misconduct or debilitating disability349 among its own members. The
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980350 authorizes "any person"
(presumably including members of the public, litigants, attorneys, judges, and
other court personnel) alleging judicial misconduct "prejudicial to the effective
and expeditious administration of the . . . courts," or alleging "mental or
physical disability" impeding the discharge of judicial duties, to file a
complaint with the clerk of the governing court of appeals, briefly stating the
facts "constituting such conduct."351 The Act also empowers the chief judge of
the circuit to initiate actions under the Act. 3 52  The 1980 Act specifically
excludes from its purview complaints about the merits of judicial outcomes.
Rather, as its name suggests, it is exclusively concerned with judicial conduct
and disability.354
The 1980 Act has been found to work reasonably well at the lower court
level by two federal studies, the National Commission on Judicial Discipline
and Removal355 and the Breyer Commission on the Implementation of the
349. For purposes of this discussion, a debilitating disability is that which "substantially
limits" a justice from performing the essential functions of his or her job, drawing on the
Americans with Disabilities Act definition of a "disability." See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006).
350. Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2006)).
351. Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 351(a).
352. Id. § 351(b).
353. Id. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii).
354. JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 26 tbl.5
(2006) [hereinafter BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT], available at http://www.supremecourt.gov
/publicinfo/breyercommitteereport.pdf. To date, more complaints have been filed relating to
judicial conduct than disability. Id
355. NAT'L COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, 152 F.R.D. 265 (1993) (containing the
Commission's findings and recommendation on issues relating to judicial misconduct); see also
JEFFREY N. BARR & THOMAS E. WILLGING, STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS AND REASONS IN
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Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.356 The Breyer Commission found a
modest two to three percent error rate in the normal processing of 1980 Act
complaints, based on an in-depth analysis conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center and Administrative Office.357 The most serious issue that the Breyer
Commission report identified concerned the handling of so-called high
visibility complaints by the chief circuit judges and/or circuit judicial councils
between 2001 and 2005. 3 The Breyer Commission made several
recommendations for the improved handling of these complaints, including
improved procedures, greater transparency of information about complaints
and resolutions, and more effective counseling by the Judicial Conference of
the chief circuit judges and circuit judicial councils on how to implement the
1980 Act.359 The Judicial Conference adopted these recommendations.360
According to a number of judges and commentators, the most effective
judicial conduct supervision occurs in the shadow of the Act, through informal
361
counseling and encouragement toward retirement. Former Counsel to the
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal Jeffrey Barr and
Federal Judicial Center Researcher Thomas Willging found in their 1993 study
that significant and meaningful informal counseling and enforcement occurs,
and that, along with the process of recertifying senior judges, "the informal
process appears to be the primary method for addressing issues of physical or
mental disability." 362 According to Barr and Willging, "Chief judges prefer to
CHIEF JUDGE DISMISSAL ORDERS UNDER THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980
(2002), available at http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/judgcond.pdf (undertaking further
empirical research for the Commission to address the content of judicial complaints); Stephen B.
Burbank & Jay S. Plager, Foreword: The Law of Federal Judicial Discipline and the Lessons of
Social Silence, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1993) (describing the various research methods that
contributed to the findings of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal).
356. BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 354, at 5.
357. Id at 5, 12-13, 107.
358. Id at 67-95.
359. Id at 109-10, 125-26; Arthur Hellman, The Regulation ofJudicial Ethics in the Federal
System: A Peek Behind Closed Doors, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 189, 242 (2007).
360. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND
JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS 2 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/Misconduct/Jud conductand disability_308 app B_rev.pdf;
Hellman, supra note 359, at 210-11, 219-43 (critiquing the recommendations made by the
Breyer Commission and offering additional recommendations for reform).
361. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation,
Accountability, and Judicial Independence Under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability
Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 131-44 (1993) ("[T]he informal process appears to be the
primary method for addressing issues of physical or mental disability."); see also Charles Gardner
Geyh, Informal Methods ofJudicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 312 (1993) ("In the final
analysis, the essential point is simply that informal processes serve a critical role in addressing
judicial misconduct and disability, and that understanding those processes and their operation is
essential to a fuller appreciation ofjudicial discipline.").
362. Barr & Willging, supra note 355, at 144.
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use the informal process because it operates more flexibly and humanely." 363
Importantly, Barr and Willging observed "the possibility of invoking the
formal process appears to reinforce the efficacy of the informal process." 364
Likewise, Professor Charles Geyh found in his evaluation of informal judicial
conduct mechanisms for the 1993 study that "[o]f all the disciplinary
mechanisms evaluated here, the least formal-communications from chief and
peer judges-appear to be utilized the most frequently and successfully." 365
Geyh went on to note that "[t]his is not to suggest that discipline under the Act
is unimportant. Indeed, it is in part because a formal disciplinary mechanism is
in place that informal means of discipline are so successful."366 The 2006
Breyer Commission Report echoed these earlier findings, stating: "Based
primarily upon our interviews, we conclude that informal efforts to resolve
problems remain (as the Act's sponsors intended) the principal means by
which the judicial branch deals with difficult problems of judicial misconduct
and disability." 367
Barr and Willging's, Geyh's, and the Breyer Commission's findings are
suggestive of the utility of adopting a formal mechanism for monitoring
misconduct and disability at the Supreme Court level, in the shadow of which
important informal conduct counseling and disability assistance could occur.
More specifically, drawing on the 1980 Act's provision for oversight by chief
circuit judges and circuit judicial councils, the Supreme Court should adopt a
system of formal oversight by the Chief Justice and a council of Associate
Justices. If complaints were filed concerning the Chief Justice's conduct, the
council of Associate Justices could respond. If complaints were filed
concerning an Associate Justice's conduct, the Chief Justice could work with
the council to respond. As with the 1980 Act's operation at the lower court
level,368 any conduct and disability mechanism adopted at the Supreme Court
level should provide for complaints by the public (including attorneys and
litigants), as well as by judges and Justices, and allow for the initiation of
actions by the Chief Justice. Also as with the 1980 Act,369 the Supreme Court
conduct and disability mechanism should not be a vehicle for complaints about
the merits of judicial outcomes. Rather, such complaints should be dismissed
and redirected through the normal judicial process, as occurs under the 1980
Act.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Geyh, supra note 361, at 311.
366. Id.
367. BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 354, at 7 ("The main problems that the
informal efforts seek to address are decisional delay, mental and physical disability, and
complaints about the judge's temperament.").
368. See supra notes 350, 355-56 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
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In sum, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices should adopt a formal
conduct and disability monitoring system. Where reliance to date has been on
informal oversight by the Chief Justice and anecdotal observation by the
Associate Justices 370-not in the shadow of a formal system-something more
formal and effective is needed. Garrow's finding of mental decrepitude among
eleven Supreme Court Justices in the twentieth century alone suggests the
urgency of this recommendation. 3 If the Supreme Court fails to adopt a
formal monitoring mechanism, then Congress should consider amending the
1980 Act to establish judicial misconduct and disability oversight for the
Supreme Court, omitting JCUS review of the Supreme Court Justices' conduct
dispositions (as provided in the 1980 Act) because the Supreme Court Justices'
conduct determinations should not be reviewed by the lower federal court
judges who constitute the JCUS membership.372 Nevertheless, it would be
preferable for the Court to adopt an oversight mechanism for itself without
necessity of congressional intervention.373
B. Adopting a Prohibition on Article III Judges' Return to Practice
The United States should prohibit Article III judges from returning to
practice, including work as lawyers or lawyer-consultants in the public or
private sectors, but not as neutral arbitrators or mediators. This
recommendation is grounded in concern for protecting judicial independence,
impartiality, and integrity, as reflected in the Code of Conduct for U.S.
Judges 3 and the two federal statutes governing judicial disqualification for
bias. 37 5  The recommendation is also informed by English and Welsh
experience, where concern for actual and apparent self-dealing by judges and
negative effects on judicial independence and integrity contributed to the
370. See supra text accompanying notes 365-69.
371. Garrow, supra note 57, at 1085; accord Chad M. Oldfather & Todd C. Peppers, Till
Death Do US Part: ChiefJustices and the United States Supreme Court 12-18, 21-22 (Marquette
Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-12, 2011)
(underscoring the need for a mechanism to respond to disabilities of Chief Justices, in part
because Chief Justices have been more likely to die in office of debilitating disabilities than
Associate Justices).
372. But see Paul D. Carrington et al., Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act of 2009, Proposal
II: Disability of Justices, PAUL DEWrrr CARRINGTON (Feb. 9, 2009),
http://paulcarrington.com/Four/20Proposals%20For/ 2OA%2OJudiciary%2OAct.htm (proposing
JCUS review of reports of debilitating disabilities on the part of Associate and Chief Justices).
373. The Supreme Court could not, of course, remove any of its members for misconduct or
disability. That remains within Congress's sole purview. U.S. CONST. art. ., §§ 2, 3; see, e.g.,
Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional Analysis, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 209, 213-23 (1993).
374. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
375. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (2006). Some of the Code's standards, specifically those
regarding disqualification for actual or perceived impartiality, are reflected in these statutes,
which are fully enforceable. See id.
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development of the convention against return to practice.376 The
recommendation builds on English and Welsh experience by extending the
prohibition to work as legal consultants as well as lawyers, where legal
consulting presents many of the same concerns for actual or apparent judicial
self-dealing and conflicts of interest as law practice.
Supreme Court Justices and legal scholars have spoken out in recent years
against judges resigning or retiring, earlier than they otherwise would have, to
return to practice, cautioning that Article III judgeships should not be viewed
as stepping stones to lucrative law practices, but as capstones to distinguished
legal careers. 377 To date, commentators have focused almost exclusively on
raising judicial salaries as a means to combat early judicial departures followed
by return to practice.378 In examining whether a correlation exists between
judicial pay and resignation rates, Albert Yoon found that the "[r]eal salaries
had a negligible effect on turnover rates"379 and that the correlation between
pension qualification (i.e., satisfying the Rule of 80) and judicial retirement
380trumps all other factors, labeling pensions as the "primary determinant of
judicial turnover."381 Yoon did, however, find in a separate study that newly
376. See supra text accompanying notes 279, 284-85, 288.
377. Jackson, supra note 9, at 995 ("[C]oncems for decisional independence could arise if
serving as a judge became a stepping stone to further advancement in the private sector, rather
than the capstone of a legal career."); see also FJC REPORT, supra note 103, at 40 ("Judge Abner
Mikva ([former] chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit)
noted that '[t]his is supposed to be the last stop on the road. A judge shouldn't be thinking about
going back to work for a law firm that's coming before him. That's unhealthy."' (alteration in
original) (quoting Bill McAllister, The Judiciary's 'Quiet Crisis': Prestige Doesn't Pay the
Tuition, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1987, at A 19)); Michael J. Frank, Judge Not, Lest Yee be Judged
Unworthy of a Pay Raise: An Examination of the Federal Judicial Salary "Crisis," 87 MARQ. L.
REV. 55, 87 (2003) ("When asked why it was important for judges to remain on the bench
permanently, Rehnquist responded that federal judgeships are supposed to be 'lifetime careers
rather than a stepping stone to other positions."').
378. See, e.g., SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES [CHIEF JUSTICE'S] 2002 YEAR-END
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Jan. 1, 2003, 12:01 AM), http://www.supremecourt.gov
/publicinfo/year-endlyear-endreports.aspx; SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES [CHIEF
JUSTICE'S] 2005 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5 (Jan. 1, 2006, 2:01 AM),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2005year-endreport.pdf (claiming that judicial
independence is eroded each time a judge leaves the bench because of a low salary); SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES [CHIEF JUSTICE'S] 2007 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 7 (Jan. 1, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2007year-endreport.pdf (stating that judicial salaries are often the same as those of first-year
associates at law firms); Stephen G. Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Public Hearings
of the National Commission on the Public Service: A Time of Crisis and Opportunity (July 15,
2002).
379. Yoon, supra note 54, at 174; Yoon, supra note 54, at 176 ("[A]ny adverse effect of
salary is likely occurring to individuals' willingness to join the bench, not to remain once
confirmed."); id at 177 ("Whatever dissatisfaction judges may feel over current salary, it does not
deter them from remaining on the bench until they vest.").
380. Id. at 145, 161-62.
381. Id. at 145.
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appointed Article III judges were increasingly wealthy as compared with their
predecessors,382 which could lessen the need, actual or perceived, to resign to
pursue lucrative practice opportunities.38 3
The ethical desirability of Article III judges pursuing post-bench
employment has received surprisingly little attention in the academic literature
and case law to date.384 In surveying senior judges about the issue, Yoon
found marked reservation about returning to practice. 3 Although some
judges believed that "they were too old to make the transition" to practice,
others thought that "doing so would appear unseemly." 386 One senior district
judge declared that "he 'did not want to prostitute [his] Article III background
for dollars with the firm."' 387  Senior court of appeals judges responded
similarly, including one who "eschewed private practice because he
'disapprove[d] of retired judges appearing in court' from his days as an active
judge."388
The only in-depth contemporary treatment of the return-to-practice
question389 is Rotunda's article, The Propriety ofa Judge's Failure to Recuse
When Being Considered for Another Position. Initially prepared as a letter
to then-Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Arlen Specter in anticipation of
then-Judge Roberts's Supreme Court confirmation hearing, Rotunda's article
focuses on the propriety of Roberts meeting with Bush administration
officials-including the President-to discuss a potential Supreme Court
nomination while Roberts was serving on the D.C. Circuit panel hearing
382. Albert Yoon, Love's Labor's Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 1029, 1054-55 (2003) (relying on data provided by Sheldon Goldman and
cautioning that "judges' peers on the bar have also enjoyed increased wealth in recent years,"
suggestive of a "broader trend of increased wealth" among certain sectors of the legal profession);
see also Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush's Judicial Legacy: Mission Accomplished, 92
JUDICATURE 258, 273-74 & tbl.1 (2009) (noting the increased net worth of district court
appointees during the last two years of George W. Bush's presidential administration).
383. Yoon, supra note 382, at 1054 tbl.5, 1056. It could, of course, also suggest a potential
barrier to entry into the judiciary for less wealthy practitioners. Id at 1060.
384. See supra Part II.B.
385. Yoon, supra note 342, at 539.
386. Id
387. Id
388. Id at 538.
389. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting that Van Tassel's studies were
historical in nature).
390. Rotunda, supra note 104. But see Stephen Gillers, David J. Luban & Steven Lubet,
Improper Advances: Talking Dream Jobs with the Judge Out of Court, SLATE (Aug. 17, 2005),
http://www.slate.com/id/2 124603 (discussing the propriety of now-Chief Justice John Roberts's
interviews with the Bush Administration about Supreme Court nomination while he was
presiding over a case in which President George W. Bush was a defendant because such
closed-door meetings test the public's trust in the judiciary).
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,391 in which President George W. Bush was a
defendant.392 Rotunda's specific concern was for whether Roberts had a duty
to recuse himself from the panel in Hamdan.3 93 Rotunda concluded that he did
not.394
According to Rotunda, a judge's negotiation for post-bench employment
with a law firm appearing before him or her requires disqualification, whether
on a party's motion or sua sponte, but a judge's interview with
executive-branch officials considering him or her for judicial elevation or other
governmental appointment does not.395  Rotunda concluded that a judge's
interview with executive-branch officials is too attenuated from the ultimate
appointment to give rise to actual or a arent partiality, in part because other
candidates are also being considered. Rotunda was clear, however, that a
"judge[] should not be negotiating for the size of their partnership draw with a
firm" while it is appearing before him or her.397  Instead, the judge must
disqualify him- or herself. 39
In discussing the relevant case law, Rotunda placed particular emphasis on
PepsiCo., Inc. v. McMillen.399 There, Judge Richard Posner concluded that it
was a violation of a trial judge's duty to avoid apparent conflicts of interest
when he failed to recuse himself when a headhunting firm-acting on the
judge's behalf (but contrary to the judge's instructions)-approached two firms
then appearing before the judge to discuss post-bench employment
opportunities.40 Posner's concern in PepsiCo was not for the judge pursuing
391. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 1002
(2005), rev'd 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
392. Rotunda, supra note 104, at 1187-90. Rotunda's article constitutes the published
version of his letter to Specter. Id. at 1188 & n.11.
393. Id at 1189.
394. Id. at 1211.
395. Id. Rotunda rejected a so-called Jobs Recusal Rule that would require a federal judge
who interviews with executive-branch officials or judicial-selection panels about a possible
judicial elevation or executive-branch appointment to recuse him- or herself sua sponte from
cases involving the government or members of the selection panels. Id at 199-1201, 1211.
Moreover, Rotunda noted that the commentary to the American Bar Association's Model Code of
Judicial Conduct expressly addresses the law-firm interview scenario, but not the
judicial-elevation or executive-branch-appointment issue. Id at 1191.
396. Id. at 1196-1200.
397. Id. at 1211. By contrast, Rotunda reasoned that a judge's potential elevation does not
involve a salary negotiation because "the salary and terms of employment are fixed. No one
argues about who gets the corner office, what is the pension plan, or whether one's draw will
decrease if the new partner is an insufficient rain-maker." Id at 1210.
398. Id. at 1211.
399. Id. at 1209-10 & nn.92-102 (citing PepsiCo., Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 459-61
(7th Cir. 1985)).
400. Id at 460-61.
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post-bench employment, but rather, for his failure to recuse himself when the
law firms (as prospective employers) appeared before him in a case.401
In contrast to PepsiCo, which featured a federal judge contemplating
employment with law firms currently appearing before him, In re CBI Holding
Co. featured a federal judge hearing a case involving a party represented by a
law firm with which the judge had discussed post-bench employment several
years earlier.4 0 2 In In re CBI Holding, Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr. disclosed
that he had had an "extremely general" conversation with a law firm about the
possibility of post-bench employment five years earlier. 403 Several days after
the conversation at issue, Judge Winter "informed the firm that [he] expected
to continue serving as a federal judge" and had no subsequent contact with the
firm.404 Quoting the United States Judicial Conference's Committee on Codes
of Conduct, Judge Winter observed that "[i]t is permissible for a judge who is
considering leaving the bench, to explore future employment possibilities with
law firms, on a private, dignified, basis." 405 Given the "very general nature" of
the discussions and the "five years [that] ha[d] passed," Judge Winter
"believe[d] it [was] clear that [he was] not recused in this matter. Rotunda
found Judge Winter's decision consistent with the Committee's Opinion 84
interpreting the Code of Conduc for U.S. Judges. 407
Lastly, several commentators have addressed the potential awkwardness of
former Article III judges accepting jobs with corporations that previously
401. Id.; see also JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 338, §§ 4-10, 4-11; RICHARD E.
FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 9.3 (2d ed. 2007) (stating that any attempt by
a judge to "curry favor" with any parties appearing before him may warrant disqualification).
402. In re CBI Holding Co., 424 F.3d 265, 266 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Robert M. Howard,
I'm Sorry, Please Recuse Me Before I Hurt Myself 28 JUST. Sys. J. 442, 445 (2007) (discussing
the facts and holding of In Re CBI Holding Co.).
Other cases have addressed the issue of judges negotiating for post-bench employment with
firms appearing before them. See, e.g., In re Continental Airlines Corp., 901 F.2d 1259, 1262-63
(5th Cir. 1990) (asserting that the trial judge should have either "rejected [a law firm
employment] offer outright, or, if he seriously desired to consider accepting the offer, stood
recused and vacated the rulings [in favor of the firm's client] made shortly before the
[employment] offer was made"); Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745, 756 & n.23 (D.C. 1989)
(vacating appellant's conviction on grounds that the trial judge's negotiation for employment with
a division of the Department of Justice linked to the prosecutor's office at time of trial was
analogous to a judge negotiating for employment with a private law firm).
Finally, one case noted that judges share the common experience of discussing the market for
former judges to return to practice with members of the bar. See United States v. Meyerson, 677
F. Supp. 1309, 1312 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("So many judges have left the federal bench to practice
law in the New York metropolitan area over the past 15 years that I doubt that there are many
judges in this Circuit who have not discussed, with some member of the bar, the 'market' for
former federal judges to return to practice.").
403. 424 F.3d at 266.
404. Id.
405. Id at 266-67.
406. Id. at 267.
407. Rotunda, supra note 104, at 1208 n.90.
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appeared before them as parties, expressing concern for judicial self-dealing
and the actuality or appearance of judicial partiality and impropriety raised by
the affiliation. Van Tassel recounted one such case:
[W]hen fifty-eight-year-old Judge Royce Savage left the bench in
1961 after twenty years of service, he ran into a barrage of criticism.
It did not escape public notice that he was going to work as general
counsel to Gulf Oil Corporation less than two years after acquitting
Gulf of criminal antitrust charges.408
Acknowledging that "[n]o one has suggested, nor is there the slightest grounds
for thinking, that Judge Savage was moved by improper considerations in the
antitrust case; and there is no law against his now going to work for Gulf," a
New York Times editorial published at the time concluded that Savage
nevertheless "showed poor judgment in doing so, because his action tends to
lessen public confidence in the independence and integrity of the Federal
Judiciary." 409
In sum, former Article III judges should be prohibited from returning to
practice as lawyers and legal consultants because both raise concerns for actual
or apparent self-dealing and conflicts of interest, which in turn implicate
judicial independence, impartiality, and integrity. Together, these risk loss of
trust and confidence in the courts, as the New York Times editorial highlighted
at the time of Judge Savage's resignation.410 A prohibition on return to
practice should apply irrespective of whether the judge resigned or retired from
the bench. Moreover, the prohibition should apply to practice in both the
public and private sectors because a former judge's return to practice in either
setting raises concern for actual or apparent effects on judicial independence.
Thus, a judge who returns to practice as Solicitor General or Attorney General
raises actual or apparent concerns for a conflict of interest, just as does a return
to practice at a firm.
I do not propose extending the prohibition to service as a neutral arbitrator or
mediator because these roles do not present the same potential for actual or
apparent partiality or compromise of independence or integrity as does
representing parties and interests. Nevertheless, work as a neutral arbitrator or
mediator does appear to "trade in on" the status and experience of being a
408. Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 103, at 363. Indeed, Van Tassel
quoted President John F. Kennedy, who, in response to Judge Savage's resignation, observed:
[T]he reason that [judges] are appointed for life is so that there can . . . be no actual
improprieties [and] no appearance of impropriety . . . I don't think anyone should
accept a Federal judgeship unless prepared to fill it for life because I think the
maintenance of the integrity of the Judiciary is so important.
Id. at 363-64 (citing DAVID STEIN, JUDGING THE JUDGES 8-9 (1974)) (alterations and omissions
in original).
409. Editorial, The Judiciary's Commitment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1961, at 36, quoted in Van
Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 103, at 363-64.
410. See supra note 409 and accompanying text.
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federal judge. Substantial numbers of 1993-2010 resignees and retirees
became neutral arbitrators or mediators post-bench, including with such
organizations as JAMS or FedArb.411 Although such work raises concerns for
profiting from federal judicial service, there are other post-bench activities,
like legal teaching or writing, that also arguably profit from prior federal
judicial service, and this Article does not propose prohibiting them (though
work as a clinical law professor would fall within the prohibition against return
to practice).
A prohibition on former Article III judges' return to practice would
eliminate or, at a minimum, mitigate concern that currently serving judges use
their positions to curry favor with prospective employers-a concern that has
both actual and apparent dimensions. So long as judges are actually prohibited
from returning to practice, and the legal profession, parties, and public
understand that prohibition, judges' independence, integrity, and impartiality
are less likely to be questioned by the public and participants, and trust and
confidence in the courts can be preserved.
Likewise, a prohibition on return to practice would prevent the awkwardness
(and potential impartiality concerns) presented when a former judge appears in
court, which gives the former judge-as-advocate actual or apparent undue
influence over the proceedings. This concern was noted in the U.K. Bar
Council's response to the British government's 2006 effort to lift the
41241
convention, and in response to Yoon's survey, highlighted earlier.4 13
Beyond that lies concern, as in England and Wales, for actual or apparent
conflicts of interest arising from former judges receiving judicial pensions
while appearing as advocates before the bench.
A return-to-practice prohibition could be implemented in a number of ways,
including: (a) the Judicial Conference could amend Canon 3 of the Code of
Conduct for U.S. Judges to prohibit Article III judges from returning to law
practice or legal consulting following their service on the bench; (b) the
American Bar Association could amend the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (and state legal professional codes based on the Model Rules) to
prohibit former Article III judges from practicing law or engaging in legal
consultation and/or (c) Congress could enact a statute denying a pension to any
Article III judge who returns to practice. Alternatives (a) through (c) are not
mutually exclusive, but could be implemented simultaneously. Alternative (a)
is offered with recognition that the Code is not binding on currently serving or
former judges414 with the result that this alternative constitutes the least
constraining, and enforceable, form of the prohibition. Alternative (b) builds
on the Code's observation that former Article III judges' return to practice is a
411. See infra app. B.
412. BAR COUNCIL RESPONSE, supra note 286, at 3 (underscoring particularly grave justice
concerns raised by a former judge appearing as a prosecutor in a criminal matter).
413. See supra notes 385-88 and accompanying text.
414. See supra note 239.
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matter for state, rather than federal, regulation and, accordingly, depends on
state enforcement. Alternative (c) likely constitutes the strongest form of the
prohibition, although I recognize that a former judge, faced with a choice
between receiving a law firm or corporate salary, on the one hand, and a
federal judicial pension, on the other, may well choose the former.
Development or further fostering of an informal professional norm against
return to practice-with Yoon's study showing that some judges have already
expressed sentiments of this kind415-might be at least as important as
alternatives (a) through (c). Such a norm has apparently prevailed in England
and Wales for decades and been enforced there primarily through reputational
mechanisms, such as eer pressure and shaming by the Lord Chancellor's
office or in the press. Although effective in prohibiting the outright return to
practice, 4 17 this last mechanism has not been successful in staving off the
growing phenomenon of former judges serving as legal consultants in England
and Wales.418 Service as a legal consultant should also fall within the norm
against return to practice for the Article III judiciary. This norm could be
articulated in the first instance by the Chief Justice or JCUS and reinforced by
the Chief Justice, JCUS, or press reports.
The proposed prohibition on return to practice is partially analogous to the
Ethics Reform Act's prohibition of former government employees working on
matters outside of government service that they previously worked on while
serving in the executive or legislative branches.419 They are partially
analogous because the prohibition proposed in this Article is not time-limited,
as some provisions in the Ethics Act are;420 does not carry criminal sanctions,
415. See supra notes 385-88 and accompanying text.
416. See supra Part II.D.
417. See supra Part II.D.
418. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
419. See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-104, § 101, 103 Stat. 1716, 1716-1724
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2006)); see also Kathleen Clark, Regulating the
Conflict ofInterest of Government Officials, in CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS 49,
57-58 (Michael Davis & Andrew Stark eds., 2001) (discussing the "revolving door between
public and private sectors" and reformers' corresponding concerns about the potential for
corruption (internal quotation marks omitted)).
420. The most closely analogous post-employment restrictions under the Ethics Reform Act
include those set forth in section 101. See § 101, 103 Stat. at 1716-17. Section 101 of the Act
amends the language of 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) and contains permanent restrictions on
executive-branch officials or employees "knowingly mak[ing], with the intent to influence, any
communication or appearances before" any currently serving U.S. government official or
employee "on behalf of any other person ... in connection with a particular matter in which the
United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest," the former government employee
"participated personally and substantially," and "which involved a specific party . .. at the time of
such participation." § 101, 103 Stat. at 1716.
Section 101 of the Ethics Reform Act also amends 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) and provides for a
two-year post-government-employment restriction for executive-branch officials or employees
from "knowingly mak[ing], with the intent to influence, any communication[s] to or
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as provided for in the Ethics Act;421 and is not limited to work on certain
issues, as is the Ethics Act.422 Rather, the return-to-practice prohibition
proposed here is permanent and all-encompassing vis-i-vis law practice and
legal consulting and anticipates enforcement through civil statutes (denying
pension benefits), conduct-code amendments, or changes in professional
norms. A compromise position could be a two- to five-year mandatory
cooling-off period between leaving the bench and entering law practice or legal
consulting. This compromise mirrors the waiting periods proposed by the
British government and the Judges' Council at the time of the government's
423
effort to lift the convention against return to practice. Such an approach
would also draw on the Ethics Reform Act's approach to cost-employment
restrictions for former government employees and officials. 24 A temporary
prohibition would address concerns for judges' actual or apparent self-dealing
(to promote future employment prospects) in the short term, but it would not
appearance[s] before" any currently serving U.S. government official or employee "on behalf of
any other person . . . in connection with a particular matter in which the United States . . . is a
party or has a direct and substantial interest," the matter fell within the former government
employee's official responsibilities "within a period of one year before the termination of his or
her [government] service," and the matter involved a specific party "at the time it was so
pending." § 101, 103 Stat. at 1716-17.
Other post-employment restrictions on former executive-branch officials or employees set
forth in the Ethics Reform Act include amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 207(b), a one-year restriction
on aiding or advising on trade or treaty negotiations; 18 U.S.C. § 207(c), a one-year restriction on
certain senior personnel; and 18 U.S.C. § 207(d), restrictions on very senior personnel. See
§ 101, 103 Stat. at 1717-19. Finally, the Ethics Reform Act also places post-employment
restrictions on members of Congress and other legislative branch employees and officials,
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 207(e). § 101, 103 Stat. at 1719-20.
421. § 407, 103 Stat. at 1753-54.
422. § 101, 103 Stat. at 1719-24 (limiting applicability to matters worked on while
employed). Many states' rules of professional responsibility include a provision preventing
lawyers from working on matters outside of the government that they were personally and
substantially involved in while serving as lawyers for the government. See, e.g., D.C. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (2007); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (2009)
(allowing former government lawyer to work on matters in which he or she was personally and
substantially involved only if former government-agency employer provides informed consent in
writing).
Concerns animating the former-government-lawyer rule include the possibility of undue
influence by the former government lawyer over current government officials and concern for use
of confidential information that the lawyer previously had access to while working for the
government. See, e.g., Robert Vaughn, The Role of Statutory Regulation of Public Service Ethics
in Great Britain and the United States, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 341, 366 (1980-81)
(highlighting similar concerns governing English and Welsh solicitors vis-A-vis protection of
former clients).
The return-to-practice prohibition proposed here would go beyond the terms of states' ethics
rules for former government lawyers by prohibiting all legal practice and consulting, not merely
those matters with which the former judge was involved while serving in the Article III judiciary.
423. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 419-22 and accompanying text.
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address the larger concerns for negative effects on impartiality, integrity, and
independence raised by former judges returning to practice.
Although a prohibition on return to practice might have serious
consequences for individuals named to Article III judgeships at young ages
who subsequently discover that they are not well-suited for the bench, this
consequence and its possible deterrent effect on judicial service for younger
lawyers is not a sufficient reason to reject a prohibition on return to practice,
given the concerns for judicial independence, impartiality, and integrity that
are at stake. That the prohibition on return to practice might cause lawyers to
delay judicial service to gain more practical experience or save more money is
not a bad thing. Indeed, having judges begin their service at older ages with
greater knowledge and experience would be beneficial, as long as conduct and
disability protections were in place to safeguard against age-related or other
competence issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
As for how the tenure and return-to-practice recommendations intersect,
some commentators may suggest that a prohibition on return to practice runs
counter to encouraging voluntary judicial retirement through increased pension
benefits and improved retirement status because one obvious post-retirement
activity is the return to practice. To the contrary, the recommendations to
improve retirement conditions (Part III(A)) and prohibit return to practice (Part
III(B)) work in concert because increased pension benefits and improved
retirement status provide an attractive alternative to return to practice by
recognizing and rewarding the public service commitment of Article III judges.
By guaranteeing retired judges regular pension increases and providing
opportunities for useful work in judicial administration, the reform proposals
redress, at least for some, the desire to return to practice. That said, pension
and retirement status reform will not compensate for much of the lost income
potential of former judges interested in returning to practice, especially private
practice. Still, the real and apparent threats to judicial independence,
impartiality, and integrity presented by Article III judges returning to practice
outweigh concern for former judges' access to lucrative law-practice
opportunities.
Finally, to the extent that judges resign or retire early to return to practice
out of frustration over low judicial pay, this phenomenon should be addressed
directly through increased judicial appropriations (specifically increased
judicial pay) and not merely indirectly by allowing significant numbers of
judges to leave the bench to return to practice.425 Today's federal judges are
425. See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, The Quest for Equality in Regulating the Behavior of
Government Officials: The Case of Extrajudicial Compensation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 488,
500 (1990) ("Although some judges in recent years have returned to practice, primarily because
of the larger financial rewards available there, that is clearly not the direction in which the
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underpaid and overworked.426 Federal judicial salaries have shrunk
substantially as compared with compensation for other legal professionals in
private practice and even academia. Congress must act to redress shortfalls
in judicial pay in order to stem the tide of former judges returning to practice.
country should move. Judges should be encouraged to serve until retirement, and a system that
makes such service excessively difficult is a system that should be changed.").
426. See, e.g., SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, [CHIEF JUSTICE'S] 2010 YEAR-END
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5 (Dec. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx; Federal Court
Management Statistics, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagement
Statistics.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2011) (reflecting increasing workload per judge); see also
Yoon, supra note 382, at 1031 ("Federal judges now hear more cases annually on average than
they did ten years ago, and their annual salaries adjusted for inflation have steadily declined over
that period." (footnote omitted)); cf William Glaberson, Unusual Turnover in New York Judges
as Salaries Lag, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2011, at Al (reporting on low pay for the New York
judiciary, leading to increased judicial attrition, specifically to large law firms).
427. See, e.g., Russell Wheeler, Changing Backgrounds of U.S. District Judges: Likely
Causes and Possible Implications, 93 JUDICATURE 140, 145-49 (Jan.-Feb. 2010); RUSSELL
WHEELER, THE CHANGING FACE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6-10 (Aug. 2009), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/08_federaljudiciarywheeler/08
federaljudiciary wheeler.pdf.
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APPENDIX A
FORMER ARTICLE III JUDGES (1789-1992) LISTED IN THE FJC REPORT:
JUDGES IDENTIFIED AS HAVING "RESIGNED" WHO RETURNED TO PRACTICE AT
SOME POINT FOLLOWING RESIGNATION 428
In order to compare the return-to-practice rate for Article III judges
resigning between 1789 and 1992 with those resigning between 1993 and
2010, I examined Van Tassel et al.'s "Appendix: Judges Identified as Having
Resigned" in Why Judges Resign to determine who among the former judges
listed there had returned to practice at some point following resignation. As
noted in the text, I defined "practice" as serving as a lawyer or
lawyer-consultant in the public or private sectors and not as a neutral arbitrator
or mediator. I relied on the information provided in the appendix and did not
attempt to uncover other information about resigning Article III judges
eventually returning to practice. As a result, my calculations may well
underestimate the proportion of judges returning to practice between 1789 and
1992.
What follows is a list of the ninety-six Article III judges who Van Tasssel,
Wirtz, and Wonders designated as resigning between 1789 and 1992 for
reasons other than age or health, who later returned to practice. Practice
affiliations are noted if available. Those marked with an asterisk (*) resigned
from Article III service because of loyalty to the Confederacy and later
returned to practice.
Angell, Alexis C.
Batts, Robert L.
Bauman, Arnold
Bell, Griffin B.
Biddle, Francis
Blodgett, Henry
Bonner, Robert C.
Byrnes, James F.
Campbell, John A.*
Campbell, Ralph
private practice
General Counsel, Gulf Oil Corp.; private
practice
Shearman & Sterling
King & Spalding; U.S. Attorney General
U.S. Solicitor General
Counsel for the U.S., Bering Sea Arbitration
Administrator, U.S. Justice Department's
Drug Enforcement Administration
Hogan & Hartson
private practice
Head of Legal Department, Cosden & Co.
428. FJC REPORT, supra note 103, at 53-122. I am indebted to the substantial research
amassed in Van Tassel, Wirtz, and Wonders's appendix to their FJC report, which sets forth
detailed information on each judge designated as having resigned between 1789 and 1992
including court(s) served on, commission date, termination date and reason, and
post-bench activities, with sources cited. See id.
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Carpenter, George A.
Chipman, Nathaniel
Combs, Bertram T.
Covington, James H.
Cowan, Finis E.
Crowley, John P.
Curtis, Benjamin R.
Dawson, Charles I.
Day, William L.
DeVries, Marion
Denison, Arthur
Dick, Robert P.*
Donworth, George
Duell, Charles H.
Duncan, Robert M.
Dyer, Charles E.
Fisher, George P.
Fogel, Herbert A.
Fortas, Abe
Frankel, Marvin E.
Garvin, Edwin L.
Getzendanner, Susan
Haight, Thomas G.
Henning, Edward J.
Hermansdorfer, Howard D.
Higby, Lynn C.
Hoehling, Adolph A., Jr.
Howe, James H.
Hughes, James
Kennedy, Harold M.
Lane, Arthur S.
Letts, Ira L.
Lewis, William
Lowell, John
Tenney, Sherman, Rogers & Guthrie
private practice
Wyarr, Tarrant & Combs
Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson &
Shorb
Baker & Botts
Cotsirilos, Stephenson, Tighe & Streicker
private practice
private practice
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey
private practice
Baker, Hostetler & Patterson
private practice4 29
Donworth & Todd
Duell, Warfield & Duell
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue
Counsel, Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Co.
U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia
Bartel & Fogel
private practice
Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel
Lewis, Garvin & Kelsey
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
Wall, Haight, Carey & Hartpence
General Counsel, General Order of Moose;
counsel for motion picture interests
Bamett & Alagia; Hermansdorfer & Coburn
Sale & Bryant
Hoehling, Peelle & Ogilby
private practice
private practice
Burlingham, Veeder, Clark & Hupper
General Counsel, Johnson & Johnson
Curtis, Matteson, Boss & Letts
private practice
private practice
429. According to Van Tassel, Wirtz, and Wonders, Judge Dick was initially forced to resign
due to his association with the Confederacy, precipitating a brief return to private practice.
Several years later, he was reappointed to the bench and served for an extended period, before his
failing health required him to resign a second time.
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Lynch, Charles F.
Marshall, John A.
Masterson, Thomas
Mayer, Julius
McCrary, George W.
McCree, Wade H., Jr.
McDonald, Gabrielle K.
McGranery, James P.
McLellan, Hugh D.
Meanor, H. Curtis
Middlebrooks, David L., Jr.
Monroe, Thomas B.*
Montgomery, Martin V.
Morris, Hugh M.
Morris, Joseph W.
Mulligan, William H.
Nicoll, John C.*
Noyes, Walter
O'Conor, Robert, Jr.
Peck, John W.
Phillips, Layn R.
Priest, Henry S.
Ramirez, Raul A.
Rasch, Carl L.
Reed, James H.
Reed, John A., Jr.
Renfrew, Charles B.
Rifkind, Simon H.
Saunders, Eugene D.
Savage, Royce H.
Scalera, Ralph F.
Scarburgh, George P.*
Scott, Thomas E.
Shannon, Fred
Shipman, William D.
Smith, Sidney 0., Jr.
Sneeden, Emory M.
private practice
Howat, Marshall, MacMillan & Nebeker
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
Mayer, Warfield & Watson
General Counsel, Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railroad
U.S. Solicitor General
private practice
U.S. Attorney General
Herrick, Smith, Donald, Farley & Ketchum
Podvey, Sachs, Meanor, Catenacci, Hildner
& Cocoziello
Levin, Warfield, Middlebrooks, Graff,
Mabie, Rosenbloum & Magie
private practice
Montgomery & Montgomery
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell
Senior Counsel, Shell Oil
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
District Attorney, Georgia
General Counsel, Delaware & Hudson Co.
O'Conor & Adler
Peck, Schaffer & Williams
Irell & Manella
Boyle, Priest & Lehman
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
private practice
Knox & Reed
Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster & Reed
U.S. Deputy Attorney General
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
Saunders, DuFour & DuFour
General Counsel, Gulf Oil Corp.; Boone,
Smith, Davis & Minter
Thorp, Reed & Armstrong
private practice
Steel, Hector & Davis
Shannon & Weidenbach
Barlow, Shipman & MacFarland
Alston, Miller & Gaines
McNair Law Firm
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Sofaer, Abraham
Starr, Kenneth W.
Stern, Herbert J.
Thacher, Thomas D.
Tone, Phillip W.
Travia, Anthony J.
Troup, Robert
Tyler, Harold R., Jr.
Veeder, Van Vechten
Walker, Thomas G.
Walsh, Lawrence E.
Webster, William H.
Wing, Francis J.
Winslow, Francis A.
Wright, Daniel T.
Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State
U.S. Solicitor General
Hellring, Lindeman, Goldstein, Siegal &
Greenberg
U.S. Solicitor General
trial lawyer
private practice
private practice
U.S. Deputy Attorney General
Burlingham, Veeder, Clark & Hupper
Counsel, New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.
U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General;
Davis, Polk & Wardwell; Crowe & Dunlevy
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McClay
private practice
private practice
private practice
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APPENDIX B
ARTICLE III JUDGES WHO RESIGNED OR RETIRED BETWEEN JANUARY 1, 1993
AND DECEMBER 31, 2010 AND RETURNED TO PRACTICE
Overallfinding: 58 out of 123 resignees and retirees returned to practice
(47.15%)
A word on methodology: I used the Federal Judicial Center's (FJC) judicial
biographical database, www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html, to
search by (1) date of termination of federal judicial service (between January 1,
1993 and December 31, 2010 in order to complement Van Tassel's study of
judges leaving the bench between 1789 and 1992) and (2) method of
termination of federal judicial service-i.e., "resignation," "retirement," or
"retirement on disability." The first search, specifying the method of
termination as "resignation" for the study period 1993 to 2010, yielded thirty-
two former Article III judges (Table 1). The second search, specifying
termination by "retirement" for the same date range, yielded ninety-one former
Article III judges (Table 2), and the third search, specifying termination by
"retirement on disability" for the same date range, yielded no former Article III
judges. Accordingly, I did not prepare a table to reflect the results of this third
search.
Once the lists of former Article III judges who had resigned and retired
during the study period were generated, I searched publicly available,
including online, sources for each former judge to determine whether he or she
had returned to practice at some point following termination of his or her
federal judicial service. I did not limit my searches to those who returned to
practice immediately upon stepping down from the bench, but, rather, to those
who practiced at some point after resigning or retiring. The publicly available
sources I accessed included law firm websites, newspapers, Martindale
Hubbell, and others.
"Practice" as used in this study and in my proposed prohibition on return to
practice includes practice on behalf of public or private entities and includes
work as a lawyer or lawyer-consultant. What is not included in this definition
of practice is work as a neutral arbitrator or mediator.
As noted above, the tables may understate the return-to-practice rates
because there were former judges for whom I could not find reliable
information about whether they had returned to practice. In these cases, I erred
on the side of not listing them as returning to practice so as to avoid overstating
the rate.
I welcome any questions or comments on, including corrections, to this data.
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TABLE 1
ARTICLE III JUDGES WHO RESIGNED BETWEEN JANUARY 1, 1993 AND
DECEMBER 31, 2010 AND RETURNED TO PRACTICE
Resignees: 21 of32 resignees returned to practice (65.63%)
Burrage, Billy Michael returned to practice430
Buttram, H. Dean, Jr. returned to practice431
Cassell, Paul G. returned to practice432
Caulfield, Barbara A. returned to practice 433
Chertoff, Michael returned to practice434
Cindrich, Robert J. returned to practice 435
Coar, David H.
Collins, Robert F.
Conboy, Kenneth returned to practice436
Filip, Mark R. returned to practice 437
Freeh, Louis J. returned to practice438
Henry, Robert H.
Holmes, Sven Erik returned to practice
439
430. Michael Burrage, WHITTEN BURRAGE, http://whittenburrage.Imobb.com/
1288751861.php (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
431. Attorneys: H. Dean Buttram, Jr., BUTERAM, HAWKINS & HOPPER, LLC, http://www.
buttramhawkinshopperllc.com/Firmlnfo/Lawyers/21393.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
432. Paul G. Cassell, Special Counsel, HATCH, JAMES, & DODGE, http://www.hjdlaw.com/
attomeys/paul-cassell/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) (indicating that now-Professor Cassell
maintains a consulting practice with Hatch, James, & Dodge).
433. Bob Egelko, Barbara Caulfield, Attorney, Federal Judge, Dies, SFGATE.COM,
http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-11-19/bay-area/24839882_1judge-caulfield-extradition-case-
jimmy-smyth (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).; see also In Memoriam: Barbara Caulfield, KAYE
SCHOLER (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.kayescholer.com/news/firm-news/20101109.
434. Biographies: Michael Chertoff, COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, http://www.cov.com/
mchertoff/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
435. Media Relations, Experts: Robert J Cindrich, UPMC, http://www.upmc.com/media
relations/experts/pages/expertspage.aspx?expertid=50 (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
436. Attorneys: Kenneth Conboy, LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, http://www.lw.com/Attomeys
.aspx?page=AttomeyBio&attno=00128 (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
437. Lawyers: Mark Filip, KIRKLAND & ELLIS, LLP, http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent
.cfm?contentlD=220&itemlD=9711 (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
438. Our People: Louis J Freeh, FREEH SPORKIN SULLIVAN, http://www.freehsporkin
sullivan.com/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
439. Establishing and Maintaining the Right Relationship Between the General Counsel and
the Chief Compliance Officer: Perspectives of Sven Erik Holmes, Vice Chair, Legal and
Compliance for KPMG LLP, ASS'N CORP. COUNS., http://newsmanager.commpartners.com/acca
exec/downloads/CLO-Perspective-Judge-Holmes.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
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Jenkins, Martin J.
Kelley, Walter DeKalb, Jr.
Kendall, [Elton] Joe
Kent, Samuel B.
Larson, Stephen G.
Lechner, Alfred J., Jr.
Levi, David F.
Lewis, Timothy K.
Luttig, J. Michael
Manella, Nora Margaret
McConnell, Michael W.
McKelvie, Roderick R.
Moreno, Carlos R.
Nottingham, Edward W., Jr.
Orlofsky, Stephen M.
Robinson, Stephen C.
Sandoval, Brian E.
Schiavelli, George P.
Scott, Jeanne E.
returned to practice440
retumned to practice441
returned to practice442
returned to practice
443
returned to practice
444
returned to practice445
returned to practice
445
returned to practice447
returned to practice
448
returned to practice
449
returned to practice450
440. People: Walter D. Kelley Jr., JONES DAY, http://jonesday.com/wdkelley/ (last visited
Sept. 16, 2011).
441. Attorneys: Joe Kendall, KENDALL LAW GROUP, LLP, http://www.kendalllawgroup.com
/attorneys/joe-kendall/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
442. People: Stephen G. Larson, ARENT Fox, http://www.arentfox.com/people/index.cfm
?fa=profile&id=591 (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
443. People: Alfred J. Lechner Jr., WHITE & CASE, LLP, http://www.whitecase.com/
Attorneys/Detail.aspx?attomey-3562 (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
444. Professionals: Hon. Timothy K. Lewis, SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS, LLP,
http://www.schnader.com/professionals/xprProfessionalDetailsSchnader.aspx?xpST=Professional
Detail&professional=142 (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
445. About Us, Executive Biographies: J. Michael Luttig, BOEING COMPANY, http://www.
boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/execprofiles/luttig.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
446. Biographies: Roderick R. McKelvie, COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP,
http://www.cov.com/rmckelvie/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
447. Attorneys: Edward W Nottingham Jr., EDWARD W. NOTTINGHAM, LLP, http://www.
nottinghamlaw-mediation.com/Attorneys/Edward-Nottingham.shtml (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
448. People, Professionals: Stephen M Orlofsky, BLANK ROME, LLP, http://www.blank
rome.com/index.cfm?contentlD=10&biolD=1358 (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
449. Professionals: Stephen C Robinson, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER, & FLOMM,
LLP, http://www.skadden.com/index.cfm?contentlD-45&biolD=9898 (last visited Sept. 16,
2011).
450. Our Attorneys: Hon. George P. Schiavelli, BROWN, WHITE & NEWHOUSE, LLP,
http://www.brownwhitelaw.com/attorneys/gschiavelli.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
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TABLE 2
ARTICLE III JUDGES WHO RETIRED PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 37 1(A) BETWEEN
JANUARY 1, 1993 AND DECEMBER 31, 2010 AND RETURNED TO PRACTICE
Retirees: 37 out of 91 retirees returned to practice (40.66%)
Aguilar, Robert P.
Andersen, Wayne R.
Baird, Lourdes G.
Bassler, William G.
Bechtle, Louis C.
Birch, Stanley F., Jr.
Bissell, John W.
Brett, Thomas R.
Brooks, Gene Edward
Brown, Bailey
Bullock, Frank W., Jr.
Cahn, Edward N.
Cambridge, William G.
Camp, Jack T., Jr.
Carrigan, James R.
Clark, Russell G.
Clemon, U.W.
Davies, John G.
Davis, Edward B.
Echols, Robert L.
Elliott, J. Robert
returned to practice 451
returned to practice45
452returned to practice45
returned to practice453
returned to practice 454
returned to practice455
returned to practice45
returned to practice 457
451. Attorney Bios: Louis C. Bechtle, CONRAD 0' BRIEN PC, http://www.conradobrien.com/
Attorney-Bios/Louis-C-Bechtle/30/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
452. Attorney Bios: John W Bissell, CONNELL FOLEY, http://www.connellfoley.com/
attomeys/bissellj.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
453. Lawyer Bio: Frank W Bullock, Jr., WOMBLE CARLYLE, http://www.wcsr.com/lawyers
/frank-bullock (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
454. People:EdwardN. Cahn, BLANK ROME, LLP, http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm
?contentlD=10&biolD=2010 (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
455. Attorney Profiles: U. W. Clemon, WHITE ARNOLD & DOwD PC, http://www.white
amolddowd.com/attorneys/u-w-clemon.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
456. In the Media: Statement from Andrew Smulian Regarding the Passing ofJudge Edward
B. Davis, AKERMAN (May 25, 2010), http://www.akerman.com/documents/res.asp?id= 8 7 2 .
457. Attorneys: Robert L. Echols, BASS BERRY SIMS PLC, http://www.bassberry.com/
rechols/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
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Farnan, Joseph J., Jr.
Finesilver, Sherman Glenn
Gibson, Benjamin F.
Gierbolini-Ortiz, Gilberto
Giles, James Tyrone
Hackett, Barbara K.
Hagen, David W.
Harris, Stanley S.
Hatchett, Joseph W.
Heaney, Gerald W.
Higginbotham, A. Leon, Jr.
Hillman, Douglas W.
Ideman, James M.
Jackson, Thomas Penfield
Johnson, Norma Holloway
Jones, Nathaniel R.
Kauffman, Bruce W.
Keeton, Robert E.
Kelly, Patrick F.
Kenyon, David V.
La Plata, George
Laffitte, Hector M.
returned to practice458
returned to practice459
returned to practie460
returned to practice461
returned to practice 462
returned to practice463
returned to practice 464
returned to practice465
returned to practice
466
returned to practice
467
458. Attorneys: Joseph J Farnan, Jr., FARNAN LLP, http://www.famanlaw.com/Joe-Farnan-
Bio.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
459. Court History, 1992-2008 History: The District of Colorado, TENTH JUD. CIRCUIT HIST.
SOC'Y, http://www.10thcircuithistory.org/pdfs/1992-2008History/Colorado%20district%20court
%20chapter--Final%20edit.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2011) (indicating Judge Finesilver passed
away in 2006, after serving for nine years as special counsel with Popham Haik Schnobrich &
Kaufman).
460. Our People: James T Giles, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, http://www.pepperlaw.com/
LegalStaff Preview.aspx?LegalStaffKey=489 (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
461. Biographies: Joseph W Hatchett, AKERMAN, http://www.akerman.com/bios/bio.asp?
id=296&name=Hatchett (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
462. History of the Federal Judiciary, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges:Aloyisus
Leon Higginbotham, Jr., FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=1039&cid=
999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
463. Attorneys: Thomas Penfield Jackson, JACKSON & CAMPBELL, http://www.jacks-
camp.com/profile.asp?data=24 (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
464. People: Nathanial R. Jones, BLANK ROME, LLP, http://www.blankrome.com/index.
cfm?contentlD=10&biolD=2251 (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
465. Our Attorneys: Honorable Bruce W. Kauffman, ELLio~r GREENLEAF, http://www.
elliottgreenleaf.com/bwk.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
466. See GEORGE LA PLATA, FROM THE BARRIO TO THE BENCH 218-20 (2008).
914 [Vol. 60: 1
Judicial Retirement and Return to Practice
Lambros, Thomas D.
Legge, Charles A.
Lifland, John C.
Limbaugh, Stephen N.
Little, F.A., Jr.
Livaudais, Marcel, Jr.
Logan, James K.
Loughlin, Martin F.
Lynch, Eugene F.
MacKenzie, John A.
Marshall, Prentice H.
Martin, John S., Jr.
Matia, Paul R.
Mentz, Henry A., Jr.
Merhige, Robert R., Jr.
Michel, Paul R.
Mikva, Abner J.
Mukasey, Michael B.
Nevas, Alan H.
Norris, William A.
returned to practice468
returned to practice469
returned to practice 470
r 471returned to practice
returned to practice 472
retumed to practice471
returned to practice474
retumed to practice472
returned to practice476
returned to practice477
returned to practice474
467. Attorneys: Hector M Laffitte, MCCONNELL VALDts LLC, http://www.mcvpr.com/
Bio/HectorLaffitte.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
468. Attorneys: Thomas D. Lambros, JANIK LLP, http://janiklaw.com/attomeys-lambros.html
(last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
469. People: Stephen N. Limbaugh, Sr., ARMSTRONG TEASDALE, www.armstrongteasdale
.com (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
470. FA. Little, Jr., STANLEY, REUTER, Ross, THORNTON & ALFORD, http://www.sfrlaw
firm.com/little.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
471. Foulston Attorneys: James K. Logan, FOUSTON SIEKFrN LLP, http://www.foulston
.com/attomeys/detail.cfm?id=361 (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
472. Attorneys: Prentice Marshall (deceased), COTSIRILOs, TIGHE & STREICKER, LLP,
http://www.cotsiriloslaw.com/attorneys/index.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
473. John Martin, MARTIN & OBERMAIER, LLC, http://www.martinobermaierlaw.com/
martin.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
474. People: Paul R. Matia, PORTER WRIGHT, http://www.porterwright.com/paul_matial
(last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
475. Patricia Sullivan, Federal Judge Robert R. Merhige Dies, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38599-2005FebI9.html (reporting in Judge
Merhige's obituary that he joined Hunton & Williams after leaving the bench).
476. Robin I. Mordfin, Mikva Retires from Clinic Service, U. CHI. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.uchicago.edulalumni/magazine/spring08/mikvaretires (last visited Oct. 12, 2011)
(noting that Mikva served as President William Clinton's White House Counsel from 1994-95).
477. See Lawyers: Michael B. Mukasey, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, http://www.
debevoise.com/michael-b-mukasey/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (noting that Mukasey also served
as U.S. Attorney General under President George W. Bush).
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Osteen, William L., Sr.
Parker, Robert M.
Pence, Martin
Pickering, Charles W., Sr.
Pierce, Lawrence W.
Pointer, Sam Clyde, Jr.
Politan, Nicholas H.
Pratt, George C.
Riley, Paul E.
Robertson, James
Rosenbaum, James M.
Roszkowski, Stanley J.
Sarokin, H. Lee
Smith, Fern M.
Sporkin, Stanley
Sprouse, James M.
Staker, Robert J.
Taylor, Gary L.
Tevrizian, Dickran M., Jr.
Thompson, Ralph G.
Thornburg, Lacy H.
Wald, Patricia M.
Weigel, Stanley A.
Wilkins, William W.
Wolin, Alfred M.
returned to practice479
returned to practice480
retumed to practice481
returned to practice482
returned to practice483
returned to practice484
retumned to practice485
returned to practice486
478. Lawyers & Advisors: William A. Norris, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP,
http://www.akingump.com/wnorris/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
479. Tyler Intellectual Property Attorneys: Attorney Profiles: Robert M. Parker, PARKER,
BUNT & AINSWORTH, P.C., http://www.pbatyler.com/attomey-profiles/robert-m-parker/ (last
visited Sept. 16, 2011).
480. See Charles W. Pickering, Sr. & Bradley S. Clanton, A Proposal: Codification By
Statute of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 807, 807 author
footnote (2006) (listing Pickering's then-current affiliation with Baker, Donelson, Bearman,
Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C.).
481. Attorneys: Sam C. Pointer Jr. (1934-2008), LIGHTFOOT FRANKLIN WHITE LLC,
http://www.lightfootlaw.com/alabama-lawyer/attorney.cfm?ID=32 (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
482. Telephone Interview by Catholic University Law Review Staff with Office Staff,
Nicholas H. Politan Law Office, Roseland, New Jersey (Sept. 16, 2011).
483. George C. Pratt, FARRELL FRITZ, P.C., http://www.farrellfritz.com/index.php?pg=
attorney-profile&aid=71 (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
484. Our People: Stanley Sporkin, Senior Counsel, FREEH SPORKIN SULLIVAN,
www.freehsporkinsullivan.com (last visited Sept. 16, 2011)
485. Nexsen Pruet Attorneys: William W Wilkins, NEXSEN PRUET, http://www.nexsenpruet.
com/attomeys-290.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
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Woods, George E.
Zampano, Robert C.
Ziegler, Donald E. returned to practice487
486. Alfred M Wolin: Special Counsel, SAIBER, http://www.saiber.com/attomey_ rofile.asp?
id=56&/AlfredWolin (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
487. Cooper & Ziegler: DonaldE. Ziegler, COOPER & ZIEGLER DISP. RESOL., http://www.
cooperziegler.com/Dziegler.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
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